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Dear Fellow Citizens,
As a group of interested former officials of the United States Government and profession-
als in the field of U.S. national security, we support the publication of this report, Strategic 
Options for Iran: Balancing Pressure with Diplomacy. We applaud the drafters of this 
paper and their goal of contributing an objective, nonpartisan analysis to a complex and 
important policy discussion. While some of us made contributions to the paper, we do 
not necessarily agree with every word in this properly detailed and balanced report.  
We associate ourselves with this paper in the belief that it will contribute to informed 
public debate on a critical challenge to American interests in the world. We also believe 
that it is consistent with President Obama’s policy of reaching a political solution while 
continuing to pressure Iran, including maintaining the option of military force, to pre-
vent Iran from building a nuclear weapon. 
The paper takes a balanced approach, fact-based when possible, to its analysis of strategic 
options for U.S. policy toward Iran.  It differs from the earlier two Iran Project papers on 
use of military force and international sanctions against Iran in that it considers policy 
alternatives and offers policy recommendations. The paper calls for greater U.S. commit-
ment to the diplomatic track of America’s longstanding dual-track Iran policy of pressure 
and diplomacy. It seeks to assess the successes, shortfalls, and risks for U.S. interests of 
the current reliance on the pressure track, and explores the likely implications for U.S. 
interests of pursuing an enhanced diplomatic effort to negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran, 
the achievement of which might lead to discussions on issues of importance to both 
nations.  The paper also offers a survey of prior efforts to work with Iran, most of which 
were unsuccessful, and suggests new approaches that draw on lessons learned from  
those experiences.  
We commend this report to the American public as a basis for open and informed  
discussion of this matter of crucial importance to America’s national security.  
Abraham Lincoln once said, “I am a firm believer in the people. If given the truth  
they can be depended on to meet any national crisis. The great point is to bring them  
the real facts.” This paper seeks to “bring facts” to the debate, in hopes of facilitating a 
productive conversation about the balance between pressure and diplomacy in  
pursuing national objectives with respect to Iran.  
This document is published by The Iran Project; the content is  
the collective view of the signers.
This paper is the third in a series of papers published by  
The Iran Project that are designed to provide a basis for  
better understanding about the standoff between the United 
States and Iran. In this paper we examine the strategic  
options for moving forward and suggest ways in which the 
diplomatic track of America’s dual-track Iran policy could  
be strengthened while maintaining the pressure track.
From the signers of this document  
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       My administration is now committed to  
diplomacy and to pursuing constructive ties among 
the United States, Iran and the international com-
munity. This process will not be advanced by threats. 
We seek instead  engagement that is honest and 
grounded in mutual respect.
President Barack Obama, March 2009
“ 
”
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Strategic Options for Iran: 
Balancing Pressure With Diplomacy 
A Paper from The Iran Project
It is time for Washigton to rebalance its dual-track policy toward Iran, strengthening 
the diplomatic track in order to seize the opportunity created by the pressure track. 
The United States should now dedicate as much energy and creativity to negotiating 
directly with Iran as it has to assembling a broad international coalition to pressure 
and isolate Iran. Only by taking such a rebalanced approach might the United States 
achieve its objectives with respect to Iran’s nuclear program. Progress on the nuclear 
issues could lead to a broader dialogue with Iran that advances other U.S. interests 
and goals in the Middle East. 
In this third report from The Iran Project, we consider the successes, shortfalls, and 
risks of strategies designed to pressure the Iranian government into changing its 
policies. We explore some of the advantages and disadvantages for U.S. interests 
in the Middle East that might flow from bilateral negotiations with Iran to achieve a 
nuclear deal, and propose steps that the President might take to establish a frame-
work for direct talks with Iran’s leadership that would build on the latest round of 
multilateral negotiations and proposals. 
Iran’s actions—particularly with regard to its nuclear program—pose complex and 
dangerous challenges to U.S. interests and security, as well as to the security of Israel 
and possibly to stability in the Middle East. This paper sets out a response to these 
serious challenges. A strengthened U.S. diplomatic initiative would not replace the 
pressure track; rather, it would build on pressure already applied. Some measure  
of sanctions relief will have to be offered as part of a negotiated settlement; but pres-
sure should not be eased without firm and verifiable Iranian commitments to greater 
transparency and agreed limits on Iran’s nuclear program. The proposed bilateral 
discussions between the U.S. and Iran would not replace the multilateral negotiations 
that are now underway. Bilateral talks would have to proceed on a basis understood 
and ideally supported by the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security 
Council, plus Germany) and U.S. allies. 
 
       It’s because of Iran’s Strategic importance 
and its influence in the Islamic world that we 
chose to probe for a better relationship 
between our countries.
Ronald Reagan, 1986
“
”
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IMPACT OF NEGOTIATING A NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN ON OTHER U.S. INTERESTS   
Since Iran’s policies and actions have or could have an impact on virtually every  
major strategic challenge and interest in the Middle East, we examine how negotiating 
a nuclear deal that might lead to a broader dialogue could affect other  
U.S. interests in the region.  
 u Israel’s security. Any change in U.S. policy toward Iran would likely be 
seen negatively by Israel, at least initially—although the achievement of a nuclear deal 
that held firm over time might eventually be regarded by Israel as a positive step. 
 u Impact on the Gulf states. Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States have 
supported the policy of pressuring and trying to isolate Iran. But anything the United 
States might do to ease tensions with Iran and reduce the possibility of conflict 
would probably be welcomed.  
 u Impact on Gulf security. A durable nuclear deal with Iran would  
contribute to improved Gulf security and might open the door to the eventual  
creation of a regional security pact that over time might even include Iran. 
 u Impact on management of challenges in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
Syria. Negotiating a nuclear deal could make possible long-delayed bilateral  
discussions on Iraq and Afghanistan, two nations where the United States and Iran 
have some common interests. The possibility of finding common ground with Iran 
on Syria appears remote now, but in a post-Assad period, collaboration might  
be possible or even desirable.  
 u Impact on U.S. strategic responsiveness to Arab Awakening. 
America’s efforts to isolate and pressure Iran have become one of the symbols of 
perceived U.S. hostility to Islam, at least in the eyes of Muslim publics. Should the 
negotiation of a nuclear deal lead to other discussions and a more constructive 
relationship with Iran, that indicator of perceived hostility might be removed.  
 u Impact on counterterrorism efforts. A nuclear deal with Iran could 
initiate a long process of identifying and pursuing common security interests that 
eventually (probably far in the future) might even enable U.S. and Iranian intelligence 
agencies to exchange information about Al Qaeda and other terrorist networks that 
have targeted both the United States and Iran.  
 u Impact on the economic health of the Middle East. A nuclear deal 
with Iran that leads to the lifting of some sanctions could produce a stronger sense 
of economic stability in the region, in addition to reducing the distortion of regional 
trade patterns and related problems of corruption. Such shifts could contribute to 
the long-term U.S. objective of strengthening the troubled economies of many  
Arab nations.
 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper differs from earlier Iran Project publications1 in that it takes policy positions 
and makes recommendations for government action. We have sought to base our  
suggestions on factual, objective, nonpartisan analyses, consulting with nearly 20 former 
government officials and experts and seeking advice from a larger group of signatories. 
In extensive endnotes, we cite much of the impressive work on this set of issues that 
has been done by other colleagues in the United States and elsewhere.
HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE PAPER
SUCCESSES, SHORTFALLS, AND RISKS OF RELYING ON THE PRESSURE TRACK  
Much has been accomplished through pressure, but the results have fallen short of 
expectations in several ways, and unintended consequences may pose risks. 
 u Successes. U.S. policies have developed and preserved strong com-
mitments from friends, allies, and partners; underscored the United States’ commit-
ment to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; blocked Iran’s efforts to modernize its 
military; weakened Iran’s economy; possibly slowed the expansion of Iran’s nuclear 
program; and possibly helped add some momentum within the existing framework 
for nuclear negotiations with Iran.
 u Shortfalls. U.S. policies may have slowed but they have not stopped 
the advancement of Iran’s nuclear program. They have not led to a breakthrough in 
nuclear talks (sanctions have weakened Iran’s economy but not yet led to changed 
policies or actions); nor have they improved Iran’s human rights practices (in fact, 
they may have empowered anti-reform factions). Efforts to isolate Iran have not 
markedly reduced its influence in the region. 
 u Risks. U.S. policies may have narrowed the options for dealing with 
Iran by hardening the regime’s resistance to pressure; contributed to an increase 
in repression and corruption within Iran; distorted trade patterns and encouraged 
the expansion of illegal markets in the region; and possibly contributed to sectarian 
tensions in the region by pushing an isolated Iran further toward dependence on 
its Shia allies. Sanctions-related hardships may be sowing the seeds of long-term 
alienation between the Iranian people and the United States. 
After 30 years of sanctioning and trying to isolate Iran, it seems doubtful that pres-
sure alone will change the decisions of Iran’s leaders. Meanwhile, there appear to 
be risks associated with reliance on this approach. A strengthened diplomatic track 
that includes the promise of sanctions relief in exchange for verifiable cooperation 
could help to end the standoff and produce a nuclear deal. 
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weapons-grade uranium for a bomb without those activities being detected.  
But as Iran continues to develop its enrichment program, the evaluation of Iranian  
intentions becomes more urgent and more problematic.  
 u Weighing the future value of engagement against Iran’s present 
antagonistic behavior. Iran’s continuing support for the Assad regime, to take  
one example, leads some experts to argue that talking with Iran would be unwise  
and fruitless. Yet some form of cooperation with Iran may be essential in post-Assad  
Syria. Near-term tactical issues will compete with and complicate long-term strategic 
opportunities on almost every issue in dealing with Iran. 
Preparations for talking with Iran: The belief of Iran’s Supreme Leader that the 
United States’ underlying objective is regime change has become an obstacle to 
progress in any negotiations. Once the President has made a decision to strengthen 
the diplomatic track of America’s Iran policy, the U.S. government will need to take 
active steps—rhetorical assurances will not suffice —to convince the Supreme 
Leader that the United States does not seek to overthrow his regime. Other early 
challenges for the President and his team, in addition to establishing a bilateral 
channel for regular talks, might be:  
 u Understanding what the U.S. wants, what Iran wants, and what 
both countries want. Iran likely wants respect, recognition of its role in the region, 
its full “rights” under international law and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, U.S. 
forces out of the Middle East, lifting of all sanctions, and a single-state solution to 
the Israel–Palestine conflict (some Iranian leaders have said they would support any 
solution that is acceptable to the Palestinians), among other objectives. The United 
States likely wants full transparency of Iran’s nuclear program and constraints on 
Iran’s enrichment of uranium, cessation of Iranian threats against Israel and sup-
port for Hezbollah and Hamas, improved human rights practices, and a two-state 
solution to the Israel–Palestine conflict, among other priorities. Iran and the U.S. 
both want a stable Iraq and Afghanistan, defeat of Al Qaeda and Taliban, no military 
conflict In the region, Gulf stability, and cooperation on drug trafficking.  
 u Understanding problematic language and concepts. Iranians  
and Americans attach different interpretations to many words and phrases. 
The differences are not trivial and can disrupt and confuse discourse. For example, 
Iran wants “talks” and the U.S. seeks “negotiations”; Iran wants to begin by focusing 
on past complaints, while the United States prefers to focus right away on “practical 
next steps.” 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
We recognize that making even minor changes in the current policy approach  
will be politically and psychologically difficult and will entail some (mainly short-
term) costs for the United States. But an intensified diplomatic effort could  
produce long-term collateral benefits for U.S. objectives in the region. 
STRENGTHENING THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK:  
STRATEGIC OPTIONS 
A more assertive and sustained diplomatic initiative with Iran would need to focus first 
on achieving greater transparency and control over Iran’s nuclear program, thereby 
inhibiting Iran’s ability to make a rapid “breakout” toward the production of a nuclear 
weapon. Excluding other issues of concern to Iran could prove difficult, however, since 
Iran is not likely to agree to a comprehensive—or perhaps even a limited—nuclear 
agreement unless it is assured about the United States’ long-term intentions. 
No change in U.S. policy will be possible unless President Obama makes the  
negotiation of a nuclear deal with Iran one of his top priorities. To reiterate, 
strengthening the diplomatic track of U.S. policy toward Iran does not mean  
abandoning the pressure track, including maintaining the option of using military 
force should the Iranians move quickly to build a bomb. But if the President  
decides to try to work with Iran, he will have to take into account the political  
and strategic challenges of managing those different policy tracks and their  
respective goals, benefits, and costs.  
 u Retaining credibility in the threat of military action. Whether  
Iranian leadership has taken seriously President Obama’s stated willingness to  
take military action to “prevent” Iran from getting a nuclear weapon has been 
called into question by critics. Their doubts would increase if the President decided 
to negotiate directly with Iran and put a serious offer on the table. Yet the more the 
President threatens the use of force, the more difficult it will be for Iran’s defiant 
leadership to consider any offer, and the more the President will be under  
pressure to use military force. 
 u Maintaining sanctions while using them as bargaining chips.  
During negotiations, the United States will need to use the gradual lifting of sanc-
tions as a bargaining chip; Iran will push for more and faster relief. Yet there are 
limits to what the President can deliver by Executive Order, without Congressional 
consent—and it will be critical to match the easing of pressure with verifiable Iranian 
cooperation on key nuclear issues.  
 u Evaluating Iran’s intentions. The latest U.S. intelligence assessments 
conclude that Iran could not divert safeguarded materials and produce enough 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF TRYING TO WORK WITH IRAN
The paper presents a complex picture concerning whether and how the United 
States might enhance the diplomatic track of its Iran policy, focusing initially  
on the resolution of key nuclear issues, and then (assuming progress in that area)  
on a broader range of concerns.  
 u Costs and risks. A decision to work with Iran would be disruptive  
politically at home and internationally. It would risk rebuff or failure, and could turn 
out to be mis-timed, either because of external events or the intransigence of  
the current Iranian leadership. 
 u Benefits and potential benefits. By making a substantial offer to Iran 
in the context of more direct and intensive negotiations, the United States could 
achieve important limits and more controls on Iran’s nuclear program, improve the 
prospects for eventual stability in Afghanistan and Iraq, and find a more balanced 
footing in the rapidly changing Middle East.
 
This Executive Summary cannot do justice to the extended debates and months 
of study that have gone into preparing the paper that follows, or to the rigor of the 
research and analysis that buttress its conclusions. We have tried to provide an ac-
curate assessment of the United States’ dual-track policy toward Iran, which currently 
relies heavily on the pressure track relative to the diplomatic track. We have asked 
what it would mean to rebalance these two tracks by undertaking a more asser-
tive diplomatic initiative that seizes the opportunities created by the pressure track. 
Despite the challenges and difficulties entailed, we remain persuaded that the time 
is right for testing new diplomatic approaches, and that a strategy that more closely 
balances pressure with diplomacy is more likely to help the United States achieve 
its objectives than reliance on pressure alone. We believe the facts, professional 
judgments, and recommendations that we have assembled here will stimulate the 
informed debate and reflection necessary for successful decision making. 
1 Weighing Benefits and Costs of Military Action Against Iran, The Iran Project, Sept. 2012; and Weighting Benefits and 
Costs of International Sanctions Against Iran, The Iran Project, Dec. 2012, For full copies of The Iran Project’s earlier 
reports, visit: www.theiranproject.org/reports.
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Beginning of talks. The first bilateral meetings are likely to be seen as both  
momentous and perilous. It will be important to:   
 u Set the tone. The U.S. side should begin by inviting an exchange of 
views on broad strategic and global issues, and seek to establish a climate of  
mutual respect at the outset. 
 u Preview objectives. The idea of a comprehensive solution (“grand  
bargain”) may be too complex and divisive to serve as a starting place, but the  
United States—with its preference for practical, step-by-step negotiations—will 
need to find a way to respond to Iran’s preference for looking at the long-term 
agenda and big objectives, such as establishing mutual respect, agreeing to  
non-interference in internal affairs, and deciding how to manage bilateral relations.
Pursuing a nuclear deal. The nature of Iran’s nuclear activities, together with its 
efforts to conceal some aspects of the program, strongly suggest that Iran seeks  
at least the capacity to build a nuclear weapon—although American and other  
intelligence services assert that Iran has not made the decision to become a 
nuclear-armed state. For its part, the Iranian government points to the fact that  
the Supreme Leader has issued a fatwa (religious decree) that forbids the  
building or use of nuclear weapons. Against this backdrop, a minimum nuclear  
deal with Iran should include:  
 u Agreement on the exclusively peaceful scope and nature of  
Iran’s nuclear program.  
 u Agreement that Iran would produce only low-enriched uranium 
(3.5 to 5 %) and cease production of 20% enriched uranium; reduce its stockpiles 
of enriched uranium, not produce plutonium, and comply with a rigorous monitoring 
program designed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  
 u In return the United States and its negotiating partners in the 
P5+1 would offer some sanctions relief and a commitment to no new  
sanctions for a period of time, and acknowledge Iran's limited enrichment program. 
The scope and timeframe of sanctions relief could be a critical factor in getting 
agreement from Iran, although the President’s flexibility is limited in this regard. 
Moving into bilateral relations. In connection with progress on a limited  
nuclear deal, the United States and Iran could broaden their talks to explore  
opportunities for collaboration in areas of common interest, such as Afghanistan 
and Iraq, drug trafficking, and making arrangements to prevent accidental  
incidents from becoming armed conflicts. Iran’s policy toward Israel and its  
activities in other arenas, such as Syria, will be harder to deal with. The goal  
should be building a pragmatic relationship that manages tensions and  
facilitates collaboration on issues of common concern.
 
15
I.
For more than three decades, the United States has relied more heavily on the pressure  
track than on the diplomatic track of its “dual-track” Iran policy. While this strategy has  
been successful in some ways, a cycle of pressure and resistance to pressure has brought  
the United States and Iran to a standoff.  
 It is time to recalibrate. Washington should now dedicate as much energy  
and creativity to dealing directly with Iran as it has to assembling a broad international  
coalition to pressure and isolate Iran. Only by taking such a rebalanced approach might  
the U.S. achieve its objectives with respect to Iran’s nuclear program.  Progress on the  
nuclear issues could lead to a broader dialogue with Iran that advances other U.S.  
interests and goals in the Middle East.   
 A strengthened diplomatic track would not replace the pressure track; rather, it  
would build on pressure already applied. Some measure of sanctions relief would have to be  
offered as part of a negotiated nuclear settlement, but pressure should not be eased without 
firm and verifiable Iranian commitments to greater transparency and agreed limits on Iran’s 
nuclear program. Bilateral discussions between the U.S. and Iran also would not replace the 
multilateral negotiations that are now under way. Bilateral talks about key nuclear issues  
would have to proceed on a basis understood and ideally supported by the P5+1 (members  
of the UN Security Council plus Germany) and U.S. allies.  
 In this third report from The Iran Project, we consider the successes, shortfalls,  
and risks of strategies designed to pressure the Iranian government into changing its  
policies. We explore some of the advantages and disadvantages for U.S. interests in the  
Middle East that might flow from negotiations with Iran to achieve a nuclear deal. These 
analyses paint a mixed and complex picture, but the findings convince us that keeping Iran  
at arms’ length until a nuclear accord can be reached is not the most effective way to  
achieve important national goals. We propose steps that the President might take to establish 
a framework for direct talks with Iran’s leadership that would build on the latest round of  
multilateral negotiations and proposals. We conclude with overall reflections on the costs 
and benefits of rebalancing the United States’ two-track policy toward Iran.  
 Unlike our earlier publications,1 this paper takes policy positions and makes  
recommendations for government action. We have sought to base our suggestions on factual, 
objective, nonpartisan analyses, consulting with nearly 20 former government officials and 
experts with experience in the region, and seeking advice from a larger group of signatories.
Introduction 
strategic options for iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy  
Addressing Iran, President George H. W. Bush 
said, “Goodwill begets goodwill.
 
George H. W. Bush, 1989
 
strategic options for iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 16 17strategic options for iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy  
this paper) doubt the validity of that assumption.3 All of the authors and signatories, how-
ever, hold that the United States should persist in its efforts to find a diplomatic or political 
solution as long as Iran does not decide to build a nuclear weapon.
	 u While we call for a significant recommitment of time and energy to the diplo-
matic side of the traditional two-track approach to Iran, we also recognize that the use of 
military force may well become more likely, should it become evident that Iran is building a 
nuclear weapon. In urging enhancement of the diplomatic track, we are not suggesting that 
the pressure track be abandoned. We are persuaded that pressure alone will not be sufficient 
to produce significant changes in Iran’s nuclear policies; an active diplomatic track with real 
incentives for Iran to cooperate will be necessary to get results. But we fully acknowledge 
that in dealing with a dangerous and threatening adversary, the pressure track is essential 
to making the diplomatic track effective. We believe, additionally, that an active diplomatic 
track is necessary to keep the pressure track from being misunderstood in Tehran as an  
effort to force regime change.
	 u We acknowledge that no single, overarching term is adequate to convey the  
complex and layered set of policies that the United States has adopted toward Iran over 
the past three decades. Terms such as containment and deterrence tend to carry too much 
baggage from the past and from the United States’ relationships with other nations. Today’s 
narrow definition of containment—which has come to imply adopting a policy of permit-
ting Iran to develop nuclear weapons while trying to deter their use—is also inadequate.  
We use the terms pressure track in combination with diplomatic track to describe the twin 
aspects of stated U.S. policy toward Iran. We also occasionally use the phrase, “trying to 
isolate Iran,” because the intention of isolating Iran—from its neighbors, from the global 
economy, and from the international community—is a common feature of many U.S. and 
U.S.-led multilateral efforts to pressure the Iranian regime to adopt different foreign and  
domestic policies. We acknowledge that a core principle and bottom line of President 
Obama’s policy is “preventing” Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. 
	 u We note that the prolonged lack of contact between the United States and Iran 
is, in part, a reflection of America’s historical reluctance to deal with foreign governments 
whose principles and practices are at odds with this country’s values. Dealing with such 
regimes has been seen by some policymakers as “rewarding” them without justification. For 
years, the United States kept such undemocratic “enemies” as the Soviet Union and China at 
arm’s length—a policy that was ultimately reversed, in both instances, with beneficial results 
for U.S. national interests and security. By withholding diplomatic contact from important 
countries whose behavior it deplores, the United States has sometimes lost opportunities 
In extensive endnotes, we cite much of the impressive work on this set of issues that has been 
done by other colleagues in the United States and elsewhere.2
 We hope that this paper will make a meaningful contribution to the national  
discussion during the second Obama administration about U.S. policy toward Iran. 
SHARED UNDERSTANDINGS
The authors of this paper brought to their task some shared understandings that provided 
our diverse group with a common perspective.
 u We recognize that many of Iran’s policies and actions constitute a serious chal-
lenge to U.S. interests and security, as well as to the security of Israel, and possibly to stability 
in the Middle East. Even as international opposition to Tehran’s policies has grown, the 
Iranian regime’s own actions continue to reinforce the perception that Iran is a threat to 
regional and global security. Some aspects of Iran’s nuclear program—including possible 
military dimensions and the production of low-enriched uranium in the absence of an active 
program to construct the nuclear reactors that would use such fuel—have raised concerns 
about the exclusively peaceful purposes of Iran’s nuclear program. Iran bears substantial 
responsibility for the mutual suspicion and hostility that defines its relationships with the 
United States and with other nations, including in the Middle East. That state of mutual 
hostility has helped to perpetuate U.S. policies designed to pressure and isolate Iran and to 
restrict its role in the region. 
 u We believe, nonetheless, that the time is right for a reexamination of the  
United States’ policy approach, even while Iran continues to expand its nuclear program  
and support Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Assad regime in Syria, among other deeply prob-
lematic behaviors. The re-election of President Obama, the pending election of a new 
Iranian President in the summer of 2013, and the toll that is being ta ken on Iran’s leadership 
and people by escalating international sanctions, have opened up some space for testing  
new diplomatic approaches. There likely will continue to be mixed and defiant messages 
coming from Iran. Nonetheless, we see indications that the environment in 2013 may be 
conducive to trying a new approach.
	 u We acknowledge that lack of success in the past makes it difficult to be optimistic 
about any new efforts to work with Iran. Mindful of that reality, we have drawn on lessons 
from the past to craft a set of options for going forward that we believe could improve the 
chances of such an initiative getting serious attention in Tehran. Our recommendations do 
assume that Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei might eventually be willing to negotiate a deal 
with the United States on core nuclear issues; some experts (including a few signatories to 
I. INTRODUCTIONI. INTRODUCTION
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to learn about their leaders’ priorities and motivations—which hurts us at least as much, if 
not more, than them. At important junctures, this policy has meant forfeiting the opportunity 
to resolve problems peacefully or to advance important American objectives that could be 
achieved only through the active cooperation of other states.4 We have been mindful of  
this history, and its lessons, in writing this paper.
OVERVIEW 
In Part II of this paper, we provide an objective and balanced estimate of the ways in which the 
pressure track of U.S. policy has succeeded; where it has fallen short of expectations; and the 
risks associated with it. Because earlier reports from The Iran Project provided an extensive 
analysis of the benefits and costs of both the threatened use of military force and the sanctions 
regime (which are the primary mechanisms, each in its own way, for pressuring Iran), this 
paper’s discussion of those subjects is abbreviated. Readers interested in detailed analyses are 
urged to consult our reports.5
 In Part III, we summarize briefly our understanding of the evolving objectives of  
U.S. policy in a rapidly changing Middle East, and explore the possible implications for U.S. 
interests of a decision to negotiate directly with Iran to achieve an initial nuclear deal, the  
accomplishment of which might open the door for discussions on a broader range of issues. 
 In Part IV, we offer some practical considerations and options for how to proceed to 
strengthen the diplomatic track of U.S. policy toward Iran. In our view, bilateral engagement 
with Iran on a core set of nuclear issues and even (assuming a nuclear deal is achieved) on 
other selected issues of common concern would not be inconsistent with the continuation of 
policies designed to restrict Iran’s capacity to subvert other nations in the region or to promote 
its revolution beyond its borders. A broadened dialogue that follows the achievement of a 
limited nuclear deal could enhance the likelihood of reaching more comprehensive agreements 
with Iran on nuclear issues. 
 After some concluding observations on the costs and benefits of trying to work with 
Iran (Part V), we provide (in Part VI) a Primer that summarizes the history of U.S. engagement 
with Iran since 1979. The Primer includes judgments on the reasons for the failure or, on  
occasion, the success of those earlier efforts. 
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Policies designed to pressure, punish, and isolate Iran reflect the recognition that Iran 
represents a serious challenge to peace and stability in the Middle East—primarily  
because of the continued development of its nuclear program, which appears to aim 
not only at the development of civil nuclear projects, but also at potentially giving Iran at least 
the capability of producing nuclear weapons (U.S. and Israeli intelligence officials believe that 
Iran’s leaders have not decided to seek such a capability and if they were to decide, it would be 
detected).6  Iran’s threats against Israel and its support for Hezbollah and Hamas are also of 
grave concern to the United States.7  In addition, during the heaviest fighting in Iraq, Iran sup-
plied America’s opponents with IEDs (improvised explosive devices) and other weapons that 
were used to kill American soldiers and hinder the efforts of U.S. forces.8  Most recently, Iran 
has been supplying arms, fighters, and trainers as well as moral support to President Assad of 
Syria, despite his assaults on the civilian population and the evolving view in the United States 
and among many Arab nations and the international community that he should step down.9  
The Iranian government’s harsh treatment of domestic opposition groups and its violations of 
the human rights of its citizens have also spurred U.S. opposition to dealing with the regime.10 
 While the pressure track has been successful in a number of ways, especially 
in recent years, some of its core objectives have yet to be achieved. Moreover, reliance 
on this track to the detriment of the diplomatic track poses increasing risks, including 
the risk of failing to achieve Washington’s primary objective with respect to Iran— 
assurance that Iran’s nuclear intentions are and will remain peaceful.
1. SUCCESSES OF U.S. POLICIES
The commitment to isolating Iran economically, financially, and politically has been 
largely successful. The sanctions regime represents an almost unprecedented example  
of the international community working together effectively, under U.S. leadership  
(with UN Security Council support in important instances), to bring significant pressure 
to bear—short of military action—on a nation that is in violation of some of its interna-
tional obligations. Cumulatively, these measures have communicated to Iran’s leadership 
that the United States and many other nations remain opposed to many of the regime’s 
policies and actions, both in the region and within Iran.
 
 
II.
Relying on the Pressure Track: Successes, Shortfalls,  
and Risks
“       Israel and the U.S. need to establish a  broader strategic relationship with Iran. 
Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres to President  
Ronald Reagan, September 1986
”
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Among other impacts, the pressure track of U.S. policy has:
1.1 Underscored the United States’ commitment to the non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons.  The Obama administration has brought intensified pressure to bear 
on Iran in order to force or persuade the regime in Tehran to reach a nuclear deal. That 
escalation reflects the high priority this administration places on strengthening non-pro-
liferation policies in the Middle East. Efforts to get Iran to make its nuclear program more 
transparent and to comply fully with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Prolif-
eration of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as well as with the mandates of the United Nations 
Security Council, are part of a broader strategy designed to show other potential prolifera-
tors the high costs of trying to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. to alter or repeal the 
terms of the sanctions at any time (for example, by removing Iran from the state sponsors 
of terrorism list, or lifting the trade ban on arms and oil).
1.2 Blocked Iran’s efforts to modernize its military. Banning the sale of  
weapons systems and high-tech military equipment to Iran and imposing targeted sanc-
tions against Iranian entities involved in such acquisition has reduced substantially Iran’s 
ability to modernize its conventional forces.11  At the same time, Iran’s neighbors in the 
Persian Gulf are becoming better equipped militarily as they purchase large volumes of 
sophisticated weaponry. Although the regional balance in conventional weapons has not 
shifted significantly, Iran has been deprived of some modern military equipment that it 
will have to copy from models or design on its own. Iran is increasingly dependent on 
domestic production of conventional weapons. 
1.3 Reduced the importation of dual-purpose materials. Although it is difficult 
to know with precision, constraints on trade with Iran appear to have limited Iran’s ability 
to import equipment or dual-purpose equipment that could be used for building a missile 
delivery system or developing a nuclear-armed military force.12  
1.4 Weakened Iran’s economy. As explained at length in our earlier paper, Weighing 
Benefits and Costs of International Sanctions Against Iran, we conclude that the sanctions 
regime—particularly the more comprehensive sanctions in place since 2010—has weak-
ened Iran’s economy, resulted in a devalued currency, reduced by nearly half Iran’s income 
from petroleum and gas exports, disrupted trade and foreign investment, and had a  
negative impact on the general public’s sense of wellbeing. The economic downturn seems 
to have contributed to elite and popular discontent with Iran’s current leadership. How 
much this discontent has loosened the grip of the Iranian regime, or whether it has had 
any impact on internal debates about the future of Iran’s nuclear program, is not clear.13  
1.5 Possibly helped to add momentum to negotiations. While the picture has 
not yet come into focus, a recent acceleration in the pace of technical discussions between 
the P5+1 and Iran may be related in part to the escalation of pressure.14 
1.6 Preserved strong relations with other countries in the region. A primary 
success of these policies has been to strengthen U.S. relations with and commitment to the 
security of friendly and allied nations in the region, particularly Israel and the Gulf states. 
The continuity and dependability of Washington’s efforts to pressure, isolate, and punish Iran 
for its threatening and disruptive actions has helped to maintain the stability of relationships 
that are vital to American interests. This positive impact may be waning, however, as some 
nations (notably Russia and China) seem disinclined to support further sanctions.
2. SHORTFALLS OF U.S. POLICIES TO DATE
Policies designed to pressure and isolate Iran are falling short of achieving some of their 
objectives, and could be proving counterproductive in some respects. 
2.1 Debatable impact on the expansion of Iran’s nuclear program. U.S. 
government officials have said that targeted sanctions on nuclear equipment and technol-
ogy have slowed the expansion of Iran’s nuclear program—for example, by making it more 
difficult for Iran to obtain centrifuge parts. But since 2002, Iran has built, installed, and oper-
ated more than 10,000 centrifuges; mastered the enrichment of uranium to the 20% level 
(which is relatively easy to enrich further into weapons-grade uranium); and announced 
the introduction of a new generation of more capable centrifuges. This trend raises doubts 
about whether sanctions have been a significant constraint on an aspect of Iran’s nuclear 
program (enrichment) that is central to the creation of a nuclear weapon. Each increment of 
pressure may have begotten a new increment of defiant expansion (although Iran did receive 
a significant amount of enrichment equipment and technical assistance in the late 1990s 
through a deal with Dr. A. Q. Khan of Pakistan, the impact of which may have been felt for 
some time, helping to counterbalance the effects of sanctions). Overall, it seems likely that 
the sanctions plus cyber-attacks have slowed the expansion of the program; other actions by 
the United States and its allies have demonstrated to Iran that clandestine activities could be 
detected, which may have deterred Iran from crossing some lines.15  The question remains 
whether the time possibly gained can and will be used to reach an agreement.
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2.2 No breakthrough yet on a nuclear agreement. For the past decade, U.S.  
policies to isolate, pressure, sanction, and punish Iran have been aimed primarily at 
convincing the regime that it needs to change its nuclear policies. The specific demands 
made of Iran also have changed over the years. As pressure on Iran mounts, the logic goes, 
Iran’s leaders will have to choose between reaching agreements on key demands being 
put forward by the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus 
Germany), or enduring sustained and increasingly comprehensive sanctions and isolation 
from the international community. As sanctions have become more severe, the United 
States and its allies occasionally have noted what appeared to be indications of a greater 
willingness on the part of Iran’s leaders to negotiate seriously. But the signals from Iran 
remain mixed. After 30 years of mounting sanctions, it seems doubtful that today’s severe 
sanctions regime alone—or even in combination with the threatened use of military 
force—will significantly affect the willingness of Iran’s leaders to agree to what is being 
asked of it, any more than past sanctions did.16  As indicated later in this report, we believe 
that the United States and its allies would likely gain more advantage from the sanctions 
by recognizing that what the P5+1 have been asking from the Iranians up until now is 
more than the Iranians are prepared to concede (or more than they believe is necessary 
to ensure that their nuclear program is dedicated exclusively to peaceful purposes). The 
P5+1 also will probably need to adjust what is being offered to Iran, in order to demon-
strate serious intention to reach a deal. Steps in this direction were taken by the P5+1 in 
meetings with Iran in Almaty, Kazakhstan, in February 2013. The meetings at Almaty and 
subsequent technical talks seemed to be more substantive than past sessions and appeared 
to reflect efforts on both sides to narrow the differences, although no major steps toward 
agreement were taken.   
2.3 No improvement in human rights protections. From the earliest days of the 
Islamic Revolution, the President and the U.S. Congress have sought to ostracize Iran  
to protest and punish the regime’s harsh suppression of domestic opposition and its 
restriction of freedoms of speech and religion. So far, this policy has not contributed to 
producing greater freedom and less repression in Iran. On the contrary, sanctions and 
other forms of pressure on Iran’s leadership may have strengthened anti-reform factions  
in Iran, which claim that the real goal of the United States is regime change.17  The  
escalation of pressure might also have reduced the already limited space within which  
civil society and opposition groups can operate. It is difficult, however, to estimate how  
the various internal and external factors have influenced the behavior of Iran’s regime.
2.4 Iran’s regional influence not waning. Neither economic sanctions nor attempts 
to isolate Iran politically appear to have limited Iran’s ability to support Hezbollah and 
Hamas and to provide weapons to groups opposing U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
So far, this has not happened; Iran continues to provide support, including money and 
weapons, to Lebanese Hezbollah, Shiite militias in Iraq, and militants in Afghanistan. Iran 
apparently has sent members of its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to advise 
and even fight alongside the forces of Syrian president Bashar Al Assad as he attempts 
to prevail in that country’s civil war. Iran’s influence in the region and the allegiance Iran 
enjoys from some violent non-state groups depend not primarily on financial benefits, but 
rather on shared strategic interests and religious, historic, cultural, ethnic, and ideological 
ties. Iran continues to maintain diplomatic relations with nearly every nation in the re-
gion, with the exception of Jordan and (as of the writing of this paper) Egypt18; is an active 
member of OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) and the Organi-
zation of Islamic States; and this year holds the Presidency of the Non-Aligned Movement. 
2.5 Ideological inroads still being made. The policy of trying to isolate Iran was 
also intended to help prevent the spread of Iran’s Islamic Revolution. While most (Sunni) 
Arab states never were likely to adopt the Iranian Shia model of governance, some Shia 
communities, especially in South Lebanon, have embraced it. In addition to helping to 
strengthen Hezbollah in South Lebanon, Iran has made ideological inroads among the  
ruling Shia majority in Iraq and to a lesser extent among Shia communities in Bahrain,  
Yemen, and Eastern Saudi Arabia, where there is growing concern about Shia restiveness 
and where the Sunni majority has discriminated against and oppressed Shia groups.19  Given 
the presence of Shia populations throughout the Middle East, it is difficult to predict how the 
new Islamist political forces in the region will be affected by Iran’s experience—or whether  
a continued U.S. policy of trying to isolate Iran could reduce any such effect. 
2.6 Iran’s government not changing. For some in Washington, the effort to  
isolate, pressure, and punish Iran is seen as one means of reaching the far broader objective of 
producing regime change or a fundamental change in the Iranian government’s policies and 
orientation. This objective has been disavowed formally by the U.S. Department of State.20  But 
the combination of strenuous sanctions and other forms of pressure, expressions of support 
for Iranian opposition groups, ongoing covert operations, and the rhetoric of some U.S. elected 
officials reportedly has been interpreted by Iran’s Supreme Leader as evidence of a de facto U.S. 
policy of regime change.21  If the U.S. goal is regime change, not behavior change, then  
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altering Iran’s “behavior” (including on nuclear issues) would not actually produce any 
easing of the pressure on Iran. With little incentive to compromise, given this perception, 
Iran’s regime has asserted publicly that its interests are best served by digging in. 
2.7 Opportunities missed to use pressure policies as bargaining chips in 
negotiations. Policies designed to pressure and isolate Iran can and probably must serve 
as bargaining chips to encourage Iran to come to the negotiating table and work seriously 
toward the resolution of key issues. Iran has indicated that relief of some sanctions would 
be expected as part of a successful nuclear negotiation—but has not supplied any specifics. 
Until recently, the United States and other members of the P5+1 have not been willing to use 
the relaxation of sanctions as a bargaining chip. As suggested above, there were signs of a 
move in that direction at the February 2013 meeting with Iran in Almaty, Kazakhstan, where 
the P5+1 offered to ease limitations on some sanctions, including trade in precious metals. 
3. RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH U.S. POLICIES
While policies of sanctioning, trying to isolate, and punishing Iran have been a constant 
through the administrations of six American presidents, questions have been raised at 
times within those administrations about whether such policies might entail risks for the 
United States, particularly if they were not producing the desired results.22  Among the 
risks associated with reliance on the pressure track are:
3.1 Narrowed options for dealing with Iran’s nuclear program. Should the 
policy of trying to pressure and isolate Iran harden the regime’s resistance, military action 
against Iran could become more likely. The closer the regime comes to believing it has 
reached a point of desperation, the more desirable the option of building a bomb may 
become. The use of armed force against Iran, as we discussed in our report on the  
Benefits and Costs of Military Action Against Iran, would set back Iran’s nuclear program 
for several years, but the costs for the United States would be high. If the U.S. were able 
to obtain multilateral or international sanction for military action, the cost to the United 
States would be reduced.
3.2 More repression and corruption in Iran. Since the regime’s primary objective  
is survival, increased pressure on Iran could produce an even more authoritarian state,  
as the leadership cracks down on dissent to prevent popular frustration from boiling  
over. Indirectly and even directly, U.S. policies probably already have enhanced the  
political power of repressive leaders and ultra-conservative factions, including the  
ever-more-powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which have been able to portray 
international sanctions as U.S.-led “economic warfare.” Strenuous economic sanctions  
also have suppressed legitimate trade and fostered a growing black market within Iran  
and throughout the region.23  Corruption is increasing within Iran’s economic system  
and elites, including within the IRGC, are gaining control of Iran’s limited financial  
resources and acquiring large stakes in key economic sectors.24  
3.3 Long-term alienation between Iranians and the United States. As  
economic and commercial isolation takes its toll on daily life in Iran, the United States 
risks losing the admiration of many of Iran’s people—including the younger genera-
tion, which is generally well educated and more sympathetic toward America than many 
populations in the region.25  Sanctions are intended to exempt food and medicine to avoid 
harming the Iranian population. But today’s constraints on all financial flows for any 
purpose are already causing shortages of food, drugs, and medical equipment, and could 
produce widespread human suffering that would be morally repugnant and contrary to 
past American policy.26  This kind of suffering could not only undermine international 
support for sanctions and hurt the United States’ global image and credibility (as occurred 
when U.S. sanctions caused extreme hardship in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, in the late 1990s), 
but also contribute further to alienation of the Iranian public. Public resentment in Iran 
over hardships produced by economic sanctions could reduce the prospects for improving 
or normalizing U.S. and Iranian relations over time, even if the current regime is replaced, 
and deprive the United States of an opportunity to play a positive role in the evolution of 
Iranian society. 
3.4 Distortion of regional trade patterns. The sanctions now in place, including 
the partial oil embargo, create new patterns of trade that are potentially detrimental to the 
U.S., European, and regional economies, imposing direct costs as well as opportunity costs 
for trade foregone. U.S. and allied firms have been excluded from potentially lucrative 
business opportunities in Iran, which are being picked up by firms from China, Vietnam, 
Belarus, Malaysia, Ukraine, and other countries willing to ignore U.S. sanctions.27  Iran 
has a purchasing power parity (PPP) gross domestic product (GDP) of about $1 trillion,28  
and the long-term loss or partial loss of access to this market would be detrimental. Iran’s 
economy, even three decades after the Islamic Revolution, remains oriented to the West; 
but there are growing signs of a possible shift that will be difficult to reverse.
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3.5 Exacerbation of the Shia-Sunni divide in the region. As Iran’s isolation  
intensifies, Tehran seems to be becoming more dependent on its Shia allies in the region. 
Shia and Sunni antagonism in the region has been heightened by the civil war in Syria  
and Iraq; divisions in Bahrain, Kuwait, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan; and increased  
competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which take opposite sides in this struggle. 
The oppression of the Shia population in Saudi Arabia and Saudi support for the  
repression of the Shia majority opposition in Bahrain have helped to push Iran toward 
defending Shia interests in the region. The U.S. decision to exclude Iran from multilateral 
efforts to reach a political solution in Syria may have reinforced this trend.29  
 Based on this analysis of successes, shortfalls, and risks, it seems that reliance  
on even the most effective U.S. and international strategy for isolating, pressuring, and  
punishing Iran—economic sanctions—has not produced and is not likely to produce  
compliance with key international demands regarding Iran’s nuclear program. At the  
same time, unintended consequences of this policy pose risks for the United States. 
 Sanctions have helped to bring Iran to the table. We believe that the United States 
and the international community can gain the greatest advantage from the sanctions 
regime by recognizing that a point of optimal pressure has been reached, when positive 
signals offered in response to cooperation can build momentum toward a negotiated 
settlement. It is time, we believe, for Washington to engage directly and more intensively 
with Tehran, and for the United States and the P5+1 to put on the table an offer that 
demonstrates their serious intention of reaching a deal—an offer that would include the 
promise of and a timetable for sanctions relief in exchange for Iran’s compliance with key 
international demands. Indeed, modest steps in this direction were taken by American 
negotiators and their P5+1 counterparts in meetings with Iranian negotiators in Almaty, 
Kazakhstan, in February 2013. The bilateral talks we propose could begin as side meet-
ings at P5+1 negotiations, or they could be brought about through third party assistance, 
or even direct arrangement. Bilateral talks would need to proceed on a basis understood 
and ideally supported by the P5+1 and U.S. allies. The U.S. would remain committed to 
multilateral discussions and to seeking a multilateral agreement on nuclear issues.  
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Iranian policies and actions are having, or could have, an impact on virtually every major 
strategic challenge that the United States now faces in the Middle East. In this section of 
our paper, we look at how negotiating directly with Iran to achieve a nuclear deal might 
affect other U.S. objectives and policies in the region—including by opening the door to 
discussion of a broader range of issue areas in which the United States and Iran might 
have some common interests. Our analysis suggests that while negotiating and reaching a 
nuclear deal would on balance work to support other U.S. objectives, such a shift from the 
traditional American policy of trying to pressure and isolate Iran would entail some risks 
for the United States and its alliances and interests. For example, Israel would likely react 
negatively, at least initially, to any U.S decision to ease pressure on Iran in exchange for 
compliance on key nuclear issues. The Gulf States would welcome the negotiation of a nu-
clear agreement, while feeling some uneasiness about what it portends by way of a future 
U.S.–Iranian relationship and what its impact might be on their own special relationships 
with the United States. And all of the states in the region would probably be suspicious 
and skeptical of Iran’s willingness to stick to a deal. Over time, in ways both foreseeable 
and unforeseeable, an agreement that produces greater assurance and transparency about 
Iran’s nuclear ambitions and that reduces tensions between Iran and the United States and 
the West would likely create a new reality and dynamic in the Middle East and among the 
nations active in the region, including Russia, China, India, and Pakistan. 
 The analysis that follows focuses on important American priorities in a rapidly 
transforming Middle East, where a decade of unprecedented political and social changes 
is prompting a reconfiguration of U.S. policy and objectives. The terrorist attacks of  
9/11 called increased attention to the threat of violent Islamist extremism, the need for 
improved global and regional counterterrorism strategies, and the importance of  
winning hearts and minds in the Muslim world.30  The war against Al Qaeda in Afghani-
stan brought a large U.S. military presence to the region; the Iraq war and the nine-year 
occupation that followed it placed American forces at the center of the Arab world. The 
Arab Awakening is transforming many states in the region. Turkey’s role is changing, and 
its orientation may be shifting toward the East. Egypt, a pivotal nation, is unstable and its 
future is uncertain. The Israeli–Palestinian peace process is moribund; the bloody civil 
war in Syria, which is becoming more radicalized on both sides, threatens to spill into 
neighboring Lebanon and Jordan and is already producing collateral damage in Iraq and 
Turkey. Perhaps as important as any of these political and geostrategic developments has 
III.
Negotiating a Nuclear Deal With Iran: Impact on Other 
U.S. Ojectives in the Middle East
“        The question both countries [Iran and the  US] now face is whether to allow the past to  
freeze the future or to find a way to plant the  
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not more tragedies.  
Madeline Albright, March 2000”
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The United States is already challenged to reconcile its role as Israel’s chief ally with its 
efforts to forge ties with new Arab governments—like that of Egypt—that are becoming 
more hostile toward Israel. Israeli concerns about the formation of such ties could amplify 
the concerns that would be raised by U.S. engagement with Iran, requiring the United 
States to provide additional assurances of its commitment to protecting Israel’s security. 
If an improved relationship between Washington and Tehran were eventually to result in 
reduced Iranian hostility to Israel, the Israeli leadership might become less critical of U.S. 
engagement with Iran; but such a reduction in hostility is unlikely absent a resolution of the 
Israel–Palestine conflict, since Iran has cast itself as a champion of the Palestinian cause.32  
2. THE GULF STATES AND OIL
There is an intimate relationship between U.S. policy toward Iran and U.S. policy toward 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States—which are Sunni-led and historically suspicious of 
Shiite Iran.33  American military, commercial, and energy-related ties with the Gulf States 
have multiplied since the United States increased its military presence in the region dur-
ing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.34  At the same time, these ties have been strained by 
the perception of Gulf State governments that the United States has failed to adopt policy 
approaches that produce outcomes fully congruent with their interests. Gulf State leaders 
also may be worried that U.S. progress toward greater energy independence will weaken 
U.S. support for them. Saudi and other Gulf States’ concerns about Iran are fed by prox-
imity, by the example of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, by Iran’s apparently increased regional 
influence and ambitions, by the intensifying Sunni–Shia competition for dominance in 
the region35, and by the implications of Iran possibly becoming a nuclear-armed state.36  
 Saudi and other Gulf leaders have supported the U.S. policy of pressuring and 
trying to isolate Iran. There is sharp disagreement among experts regarding the likely 
response of Gulf leaders to U.S. negotiations with Iran. Some feel that the overriding 
interest of Gulf leaders is in ensuring their own security and avoiding another war in the 
region.37  Anything the United States might do that eases tensions with Iran and reduces 
the possibility of violence therefore would probably be greeted with some relief. Other 
experts believe that fears of rising Iranian (Shia) influence and political evangelism 
would outweigh relief over a nuclear deal.38    
 Should the process of negotiating a deal imply a significantly more trusting or 
friendly U.S. orientation toward Iran, however, the Gulf States might become suspicious 
and skeptical about the real extent of America’s support for them. Gulf leaders would 
probably oppose a U.S. effort to build a more direct and constructive working relationship 
been the economic decline of many Arab states, just at a time when their transforming 
societies require economic and financial stability and growth.  
 Iran is an important presence in the changing Middle East, with the ability and 
the desire to influence events in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, the Palestinian 
territories, and beyond—places where some of the most challenging dynamics in  
the region are at work. Paradoxically, U.S military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq have  
enhanced Iran’s influence by removing from power two potent enemies of Iran, the  
Taliban and Saddam Hussein, and facilitating Iraq’s emergence as the first Arab  
Shia-majority-run state. At the same time, U.S. influence and leverage in other parts of  
the region have been diffused. Even if the United States is able to strike an initial nuclear 
deal with Iran, the United States will need to continue asking what combination of  
pressure and enhanced diplomatic engagement would enable the United States to  
challenge and confront Iran’s role in the region when necessary, while seeking common 
cause with Iran when doing so might advance American interests. However constructive  
a nuclear deal might be, Iran is not likely to be willing to collaborate with the United 
States in other areas of common concern, unless and until the United States recognizes 
that Iran is and will remain a pivotal state in the region. 
 We now briefly explore the impacts that negotiating a nuclear deal with Iran 
might have on seven American objectives in the changing Middle East.
1. ISRAEL’S SECURITY AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
The combination of Iran’s near-capability of producing a nuclear weapon, its open  
opposition to a Jewish state, and its support of Hezbollah and Hamas has made U.S. efforts 
to pressure and isolate Iran synonymous in the minds of many Americans and Israelis with 
supporting Israel. Any changes in that policy orientation would be seen negatively by Israel, 
at least initially. If the United States were to negotiate a limited nuclear deal with Iran that 
held firm over a long period of time, Israel might eventually come to view that result as a 
positive step, although mistrust and suspicion of Iran would likely persist. Should it become 
evident that Iran was violating its agreements with the United States and the P5+1, the  
possibility of armed conflict would likely increase. It is unclear whether the achievement of  
a limited nuclear deal with Iran would have any direct impact on the prospects for Israeli– 
Palestinian agreement on a two-state solution. But Israel will continue to see Iran as its  
major enemy in the region as long as Iran maintains its support for Hezbollah and Hamas 
and the Israel–Palestine conflict remains unresolved.31  
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with Iran on non-nuclear issues, even if the effort were limited to a few specific issue 
areas, such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Over the long term, however, a more balanced U.S. 
policy approach that sought to build relationships on both sides of the Sunni–Shia divide 
could enhance America’s ability to deal with and to be understood by Muslim-majority 
states and societies in the region. At least it could help the United States avoid becoming 
aligned by default or inertia with the Sunnis against the Shia, which would be problem-
atic given the tensions between the two sects and how those tensions are likely to play out 
in Iraq, Syria, and Bahrain.  
 The impact of a nuclear deal with Iran on the petroleum markets is less clear. 
While the United States. may be becoming less dependent on oil from the Gulf, neither 
world dependence (especially China’s dependence) on the region’s oil nor oil’s global 
fungibility are likely to diminish in the foreseeable future.39  Ensuring regional stability 
and preventing significant fluctuations in the supply or price of oil will remain important 
objectives for the United States and other major powers. Iran holds the world’s fourth-
largest proven oil reserves and the market would react negatively to further reductions 
in the amount of oil Iran is able to supply, if the loss was not quickly offset by decreased 
global demand or increased production by the Saudis or others.40  Real progress toward 
a limited nuclear deal with Iran would therefore be welcomed by the world’s oil markets. 
While a U.S.–Iranian effort to broaden the dialogue could initially create new uncertain-
ties, over time it would likely lead to greater stability in the oil markets, particularly if 
more Iranian oil were to become available. Major importers, including China, would be 
pleased by the resulting (probably slight) decline in the price of oil; oil producers such  
as the Gulf States and Russia would likely be less so. 
3. GULF SECURITY
By definition, any agreement with Iran that lowers the risk of war would contribute to  
Gulf security. But it is not so clear how a stronger U.S. commitment to diplomacy with Iran 
on nuclear issues might affect the possibility of a collective security agreement in the Gulf.  
 Ever since the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was formed in 1981, the six member 
states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman) have 
expressed a shared interest in one another's security and pledged to work together to confront 
threats, both internal41 and external. Some form of broader Gulf security agreement would be 
in the interest of the United States. A nuclear agreement with Iran that would eventually lead 
to lowering the hostility in the Gulf would over the long term permit thinking of a regional 
security pact that might eventually include Iran. Such a regional pact would provide greater 
long-term stability than one that was directed against Iran. Encouraging such a pact might 
be a valid long-range strategy for the United States.42  
 Both Saudi Arabia and Israel would be deeply opposed to the United States  
embracing such an objective over the near term. The inclusion of Iran as a possible  
participant in any Gulf security pact is likely to remain an unfulfilled objective for the 
foreseeable future. Even the achievement of a nuclear deal with Iran probably would 
not have an immediate impact on the prospects for a collective security agreement that 
includes Iran, given the long history of distrust and the cultural differences between 
Iranians and Arabs. But a nuclear deal would add to regional security and could help to 
keep open that possibility. Continued reliance on a U.S. policy of pressuring and isolating 
Iran, on the other hand, might add to the momentum toward creating a regional  
military pact that is aligned against Iran and backed to some extent by the United 
States—an outcome that would reflect the current dynamics of the region but  
probably exacerbate tensions there. 
4. AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ, AND SYRIA
At times in the past, when the Islamic Republic and the United States found that they 
shared core interests, they were able to overcome their mutual hostility, at least for a  
brief period, in order to work in tandem—as they did in Afghanistan in 2001.43  The 
negotiation of even a limited nuclear agreement with Iran could open the door to long 
delayed and desired bilateral discussions on two problems of great security and political 
interest to both Iran and the United States: the futures of Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite 
serious differences, Iran and the United States have some common interests in Iraq and 
Afghanistan that are not being taken adequately into account by either side. Iran’s role 
in Iraq has often been antagonistic to U.S. interests and has even resulted in the deaths 
of American troops. Yet both nations have a stake in the stability and growth of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, which share long borders with Iran and where the United States has made 
enormous commitments of blood and treasure over the past decade.44  The possibility 
of finding common ground on Syria, another major regional challenge, now appears 
remote, but the dynamics may change in the future, should the Assad regime fall or be 
brought down.
4.1 In Afghanistan, both Iran and the United States have been supporting the  
Karzai government; both want to see a new, effective central government in place when 
Karzai departs, in 2014. Both are investing substantial assets in Afghanistan’s economic 
and political development. Both oppose the Taliban returning to power, are strongly 
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hostile toward Al Qaeda, want better control of drug trafficking, and seek improved 
Afghan capacity to provide security as U.S. military forces are withdrawn. Some experts 
believe that without Iran’s cooperation, stability in Afghanistan post-2014 will be difficult 
to achieve.45  Washington and Tehran each have shown a willingness at times to talk 
about Afghanistan, only to back away at the last minute. We believe that Iran’s resistance 
to bilateral talks is a reaction to the U.S. policy of trying to isolate Iran politically. This 
dynamic, which is blocking a potentially advantageous discourse, could change following 
the successful negotiation of a nuclear deal.46 
4.2 Iraq. While the United States had combat forces in Iraq, American hostility to-
ward Iran increased markedly, as evidence accumulated of Iranian efforts to undermine 
American objectives there, including by supplying insurgents with explosive devices 
that killed American soldiers.47  Yet even during those years, the United States and Iran 
made occasional efforts to hold mid-level discussions about what seemed to be common 
interests in Iraq. Tehran and Washington both supported majority (Shia) rule and the 
Maliki government, and both have an interest in encouraging economic development in 
Iraq (in fact, Iran was one of the largest suppliers of economic assistance to Iraq, after the 
United States).48  Iran and the United States both also oppose “Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia” 
and other Sunni terrorist groups operating in Iraq. There is even some evidence that the 
Islamic Republic might have played a role in damping down the disruptive (and anti-
American) activities of Moqtada al Sadr’s Shia army at a critical moment in the Iraq war, 
out of concern that the violence might weaken the Maliki government. Now, with ethnic 
and secular violence in Syria moving into the border region of Iraq, there may be an  
opportunity to explore whether Iran and the United States might find grounds for  
cooperation in promoting stability in Iraq Such cooperation is probably unlikely in the 
near term (among other challenges, Iraq’s decision to permit Iranian over-flights to  
supply the Assad regime with military assistance has become a source of tension between 
Washington and Baghdad). But again, some experts argue that eventually, cooperation 
with Iran will be essential to achieving stability in Iraq.  
 Continued reliance on policies designed to isolate Iran politically would inhibit 
any exploration of opportunities for cooperation in Iraq. A U.S. initiative to achieve a 
limited nuclear agreement with Iran could help to open the door to bilateral talks about 
Iraq as well as Afghanistan. We are not suggesting that such discussions would be easy 
or always fruitful; but some level of collaboration with Iran on Iraq seems possible and 
would likely serve to advance U.S. interests. 
 4.3 Syria. Iran today is a major contributor to Assad’s ability to stay in power 
in Syria.49  Iran is therefore regarded as a formidable obstacle to the resolution of the 
conflict there. Iran’s role in Syria may be an argument against bilateral talks with Iran  
on any subject, including nuclear issues. But this is not the position of the Obama 
administration, which has signaled its interest in negotiating seriously with Iran on the 
nuclear question.50  Washington’s decision to exclude Iran from all regional efforts to seek 
a political solution in Syria reflects concerns that Iran would play a role that is contrary 
to American interests and values. But as the deteriorating situation in Syria leads,  
presumably, to the end of the Assad regime (the current U.S. prediction), Iran’s interests 
and objectives likely will change significantly. Sunni radicals appear to be gaining greater  
influence and control in parts of Syria. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps has been  
training large numbers of soldiers from the Alawite (Shia-related) minority—the  
religious group that supports Bashar Assad—which is radicalizing that group. But after 
Assad’s fall, the Alawite community would likely face severe persecution. In post-Assad 
Syria, it is not impossible that Iran and the United States might find that they have a  
mutual interest in ensuring the protection of the Alawites and combating radical Sunni  
dominance (although U.S. and Iranian interests in Syria likely will continue to conflict  
in other respects, even after Assad’s fall).
5. ARAB AWAKENING
Designing a long-term strategic plan and coherent tactics to respond to the Arab nations’ 
desire to reform their political and economic structures is perhaps the most challenging 
and complex policy problem the Obama administration faces in the Middle East. This is 
particularly true as America’s influence in the region has declined and the United States 
ability to affect the course of events has become more limited. Coping with this challenge 
will require flexibility and adaptability, but also adherence to long-standing American 
values. Some new U.S. policy approaches have begun to emerge, including a reluctance to 
deploy ground combat forces and a willingness to talk with Islamist political leaders not 
associated with al Qaeda.51
 The policy of trying to isolate Iran politically was designed in part to insulate the 
rest of the region from Shiite radical ideas and leadership. Yet Arab nations in transition, 
while rejecting the Iranian “model,” are embracing some of the fundamentalist Islamic 
political and social concepts that the United States had hoped to contain. Meanwhile, 
America’s efforts to isolate and pressure Iran have become one of the symbols of the United 
States’ perceived hostility toward Islam, at least in the eyes of a broader Muslim audience. 
Should the negotiation of a nuclear deal lead to other direct discussions and a more con-
structive U.S. relationship with Iran, the United States might remove at least one perceived 
indicator of its hostility toward the Muslim world. 
III.   NEGOTIATING A NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN: IMPACT ON OTHER U.S.   
 OJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
III.   NEGOTIATING A NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN: IMPACT ON OTHER U.S.  
 OJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
 
strategic options for iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy 38 39strategic options for iran: balancing pressure with diplomacy  
6. TERRORISM
Since 9/11, the most significant change in American national security policy has been the 
need for American Presidents to focus on the terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland and 
on terrorist activities around the world that endanger U.S. citizens and interests. Much of 
the national security agenda is shaped by concerns about the possibility of another major 
terrorist attack on the United States and reports of loose oversight of some stockpiles of 
fissile material. These concerns extend to the possibility that Iran might become a source 
for a terrorist nuclear weapon, however unlikely that might seem to many experts. Iran 
opposes anti-Shia groups such as Al Qaeda (and its franchisees), the Taliban, and other 
selected terrorism organizations (mostly Sunni) around the world. Collaboration with 
Iran to combat these groups is possible.52 
 U.S. intelligence agencies have often collaborated with the intelligence organi-
zations of hostile states for a common purpose. President Nixon and Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger shared highly classified information with Chairman Mao and Premier 
Zhou En-lai about Soviet military positions along the Chinese border and military 
preparedness.53  Steps taken now to strengthen the diplomatic track of U.S. policy toward 
Iran might initiate a long process of trust-building—starting with Iranian agreement and 
adherence to the terms of a nuclear deal—that could lead, at some point in the distant  
future, to an exchange of information with Iran about individual Al Qaeda leaders and 
activities. At a minimum, the United States and Iran might in the future recognize that 
they have common enemies. Continued Iranian support of Hezbollah and Hamas, which 
the United States has designated as terrorist groups, severely complicates the prospects for 
cooperation in this area, given the realities of domestic U.S. politics and the importance of the 
U.S. relationship with Israel. The Saudis would oppose U.S. support for Iranian activities against 
any Sunni group.54  The Israelis likewise would be troubled by any exchange of intelligence 
with Iran. Yet Israeli intelligence work is agile and understandably far reaching when it 
comes to protecting Israel’s security—for example, Israel exchanged intelligence with and 
collaborated in the sale of weapons to the Islamic Republic during the Iran–Iraq war in 
the 1980’s (as described in the Primer at the end of this paper).
7.  ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL HEALTH OF NATIONS  
 IN THE REGION
A number of Arab states, particularly Egypt and Tunisia, are experiencing economic  
stagnation, high unemployment, and lack of foreign investment (in fact, dissatisfaction 
with economic conditions was one source of the public protests that led to the Arab 
Awakening). Lebanon and Jordan also have become weaker economically over the past 
several years; Syria’s economy, of course, is now crippled by civil war.55  
 One unintended consequence of the escalating sanctions against Iran has been 
the decline of regional trade with Iran, one of the wealthiest and largest economies in the 
Middle East. As we pointed out in our paper on Weighing Benefits and Costs of Inter-
national Sanctions against Iran, the loss of Iran as a commercial partner may hurt the 
economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, which had enjoyed a blossoming 
of trade with Iran before the tightened sanctions came into effect.56  Another unintended 
consequence of sanctions has been the rapid expansion of corruption and unofficial, 
black-market trade between Iran and Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey, and some of the Gulf 
States. This illicit trading undermines open commerce and concentrates income in the 
hands of a few criminal or favored traders in each of the countries—including the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps, in Iran.57  A limited nuclear deal that leads to the lifting of 
some of the most severe sanctions (especially those that distort regional trading patterns) 
in return for Iranian compliance with key international demands would not only advance 
U.S. and regional security objectives, but also promote America’s long-term interest in 
strengthening the economies of Middle East nations. 
 Making even minor changes in a well-established policy approach will be  
politically and psychologically difficult and will entail some short-term costs for the 
United States. But it appears that an intensified diplomatic effort that produced an initial 
nuclear deal also would produce some significant long-term collateral benefits for U.S. 
objectives in the region. We do not underestimate the difficulties or risks associated with 
an enhanced diplomatic initiative, even if it is successful. Despite the challenges, how-
ever, we believe it is time for a reevaluation and modification of America’s reliance on 
policies designed only to pressure and isolate Iran. 
 While we advocate strengthening the diplomatic track, we also hold that the 
sanctions and other forms of pressure imposed on Iran are essential bargaining chips 
that make the achievement of a nuclear deal more possible. The way to move forward in 
negotiations is not to ease sanctions in advance (with the possible exception of removing 
those strictures on financial transactions that have interrupted the export of food and 
medicine to Iran, as described below), but to put sanctions relief on the table as a part  
of a negotiated nuclear settlement, so that the United States and the international  
community can get what they want and need out of dealing with Iran.
 In Part IV of this paper, we explore how such an initiative to work with Iran 
might be undertaken. 
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Virtually every American administration since 1979 has tried to find a way to work 
with Iran, only to be faced with the same core questions. Whether, when, and how to 
start talks with Iran’s inaccessible—and often resistant—leaders? Once talks have begun, 
what, if anything, to offer Iran in order to get what the United States wants, including 
on nuclear issues? How to bridge the growing cultural and psychological divide and the 
deep-seated distrust that makes even indirect negotiation so uncomfortable, if not dis-
agreeable, for both parties? As summarized in Part VI of this paper (the Primer on Prior 
Initiatives to Improve U.S.–Iran Relations), the long, frustrating history of presidential 
efforts to reverse the downward spiral of relations with Iran demonstrates the profound 
mutual distrust and misunderstanding that shape the words and actions of both govern-
ments. Iranians with whom we have spoken tell us that similar questions arise when Iran 
contemplates working with the United States. 
 Of course, the tensions between the United States and Iran are not just the result 
of bad attitudes and difficult processes. The enmity between the United States and Iran 
reflects real differences, threats, conflicts, and offenses, which we have discussed in earli-
er sections of this paper and in our two previous reports. These problems, if not resolved 
or managed more effectively, could lead to armed conflict with Iran or even a war in 
the Middle East and beyond. We focus here on strategies for working directly with Iran 
because our analysis suggests that the effective management of the problems between the 
two countries—as well as some problems in the region—will require such an approach. 
The goal would be to build a practical relationship that could over time help the United 
States achieve its principal objectives without resort to force. Reaching this goal would 
necessarily be a gradual process, with one step back for every two steps forward.  
 As we have noted, strengthening the diplomatic track of U.S. policy toward 
Iran does not mean abandoning the pressure track, including maintaining the option of 
using military force should the Iranians move quickly to build a bomb. Nor does it mean 
reducing the use of surveillance and intelligence gathering to detect any changes in the 
status of Iran’s nuclear program. But if the President decides to try to work with Iran, 
he will have to take into account the political and strategic difficulty of managing those 
policy tracks and their respective goals, benefits, and costs. The challenges would include: 
	 u Retaining the credibility of threatened military action. Whether  
Iranian leadership has taken seriously President Obama’s stated willingness to take  
military action to “prevent” Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, it has been called into 
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in the region—and the conflict in Syria threatening to exacerbate those tensions—the United 
States may find that working with Iran is essential to managing post-Assad challenges. While 
this probably means starting now to build a more constructive U.S.–Iran relationship, it is  
difficult to make that case given deep concerns over Iran’s actions in Syria today.  
 In addition to managing different policy tracks, the Administration also would 
have to manage the coordination of bilateral talks between the U.S. and Iran with the 
ongoing P5+1 multilateral process and the concerns of other allies.     
 In the outline that follows, we draw on the history of U.S. relations with Iran 
and on our own experience as senior policy makers to lay out some practical consider-
ations and strategic options for strengthening the diplomatic track of U.S. policy toward 
Iran. We explore what such an effort might look like and how the United States. should 
prepare for it. We also examine some of the obstacles that the administration should ex-
pect to encounter in trying to engage constructively with Iran’s leaders. We have tried to 
suggest how the United States might avoid or overcome those obstacles, including several 
roadblocks that may have helped to derail past efforts.  
 We assume that the Obama administration has already done a great deal of 
thinking and planning along these lines. We believe, however, that an outline of this sort 
can contribute to informed public debate. 
1. GETTING READY TO DEAL WITH IRAN  
1.1 Reaching a presidential decision. Unless the President makes it clear to his 
closest advisers that he has decided the United States must seek some form of engage-
ment with Iran, nothing will move forward. Any such decision obviously will have to 
weigh the potential for success or failure and the consequences. While the entry point for 
this effort would be the negotiation of an initial nuclear deal (through a mix of bilateral 
and multilateral discussions), in practice it may prove difficult to exclude other issues 
from consideration. In fact, the Iranians may not be willing to agree to any nuclear 
deal unless they are reassured about the long-term intentions of the United States. The 
President will want to inform his advisors that an early task of any negotiations must 
be the development of a mutual recognition that each nation has interests and rights in 
the region and that both nations will work to find common ground on those interests 
wherever possible. Both nations must find a way to deal practically with the other as a 
government with responsibilities and interests, not as an idea (e.g., Islamic theocracy, or 
“an imminent nuclear bomb”). 
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question by critics. Their doubts would increase if the President decided to negotiate 
directly with Iran and put a serious offer on the table. Yet the more the President threatens 
the use of force, the more difficult it will be for Iran’s defiant leadership to consider any 
offer, and the more the President will be under pressure to use military force.  
	 u Keeping up the pressure with sanctions while using them as 
bargaining chips in negotiations. Reaching a nuclear agreement with Iran will require 
the United States and other members of the P5+1 to provide some sanctions reductions as part 
of a quid pro quo with Iran. Meanwhile, the Iranians will push for a plan, a timetable, and a 
commitment to lift all sanctions. Given the complexity of the sanctions regime—including its 
multiple objectives—and the limits on the President’s power to lift sanctions that are embodied 
in legislation (some other sanctions can be lifted by Executive Order), it will be difficult to 
draw up a rational, calibrated program for maintaining some and lifting other sanctions as 
part of negotiations with Iran.59 
	 u Evaluating Iranian intentions given continued progress in Iran’s 
enrichment program. Finding the right balance among U.S. policy tracks depends 
on being able to assess the Iranian regime’s intentions and willingness to consider a deal 
that limits and ensures greater transparency in Iran’s nuclear program. During the past 
year, Iran has virtually completed its deeply buried Fordow facility (which is producing 
20% enriched uranium), brought more efficient centrifuges on line, and moved forward 
on its heavy water production facility and its Arak reactor, which may be able to produce 
plutonium, another source of fissile material for a bomb. At the same time, however, Iran 
has converted some of its stock of 20% enriched uranium into fuel plates for its Tehran 
Research Reactor, thus keeping the stockpile below the level that would constitute a basis 
for creating a single nuclear bomb. Evaluating Iran’s intentions is becoming both more 
urgent and more difficult, although the latest Worldwide Threat Assessment from the U.S. 
Director of National Intelligence concludes that Iran could not divert safeguarded materi-
als and produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a bomb without those activities 
being detected.60 
 u Weighing the future value of engagement against Iran’s antago-
nistic behavior in the present. In direct opposition to the United States and much  
of the international community, Iran seems committed to continued support for the Assad 
regime in Syria, despite the devastating impact of Syria’s civil war on civilian populations 
and the mounting casualties on all sides of the conflict. Iran’s role in Syria is a serious ob-
stacle to any U.S. effort to work directly with Iran. But with sectarian violence intensifying 
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elections in June 2013 (if the elections themselves are not a source of serious controversy) 
might be an appropriate time for this kind of signal, although some experts argue for an 
immediate move by the United States.63  Steps taken before the election could run afoul 
of tensions between the Supreme Leader—who likely wants to stay in full control of the 
U.S. rapprochement issue—and President Ahmadinejad’s faction, which is espousing 
an approach to rapprochement that the President would manage, as a way of ensuring 
continued influence for Ahmadinejad in Iran’s political life.64 
1.3 Outlining the U.S. end game. If the United States should decide to undertake a 
long-term effort to change the relationship with Iran, planners and diplomats from both 
countries will want to know where the United States would like the relationship to stand 
in (for example) five years. In private meetings, many Iranians have stressed that Iran 
would reject a U.S. negotiating strategy made up only of step-by-step confidence build-
ing measures, without a vision of the long-range U.S. agenda. U.S. diplomats will need 
to convey Washington’s vision to Iran’s leadership at some early point, along with ideas 
about how the United States and Iran might consider phasing in their efforts to create a 
new relationship. 
A vision for the five-year endgame might include, for example: 
 1.3.1 Mutual international obligations. The United States and Iran will 
have agreed that they both will play a positive role especially in regional relations but 
also in broader international relations; collaborate in international organizations; accept 
and observe treaty obligations; and remain committed to the UN Charter and to non-
interference in the internal affairs of other states. 
 1.3.2 Bilateral agreements. The United States and Iran will agree to work 
toward normalization of their relations; recognize that both nations have important and 
legitimate interests in the region (which they will try to define); seek resolution of the  
nuclear issues to the fullest extent possible; open up a process for increasing bilateral 
trade; work toward the resolution of bilateral disputes based on, the understandings 
in the Algiers Accords, among other principles; make it possible for the people of each 
nation to enjoy visiting the other; and initiate official exchanges as well as academic, 
scientific, cultural, and other citizen exchanges. 
1.4 Establishing a bilateral channel for regular communication and appointing 
a trusted chief negotiator. Multilateral negotiations with Iran are limited to issues of 
common interest to the P5+1. It has proven difficult to accomplish much in such large 
gatherings where confidentiality and opportunities for personal contact are hard to come 
1.2 Convincing Iran’s Supreme Leader that the United States does not seek regime 
change. As noted earlier in this paper, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 
reportedly believes that the underlying objective of all U.S. policies toward Iran is regime 
change.61  This belief is based on Iran’s (hardly unique) propensity to interpret U.S.  
actions in ways that fit its expectations—an outlook that will continue to shape thinking 
within the Iranian leadership. Unfortunately, this interpretation of U.S. intentions some-
times has been reinforced by American policies, rhetoric, and actions, as noted earlier. 
It has become an enormous obstacle to progress in any negotiations. Verbal or written 
assurances on this score from the President unfortunately are likely to be seen as efforts 
at deception. They will not be sufficient to change the Leader’s beliefs, given the regime’s 
near-certainty about what history has shown to be the “real” goal of U.S. policies toward 
Iran. (Of course, the Iranian leadership’s distrust of U.S. intentions regarding their regime 
is paralleled by U.S. distrust of Iran’s intentions regarding nuclear weapons.) 
 Practical steps—actions—that demonstrate the United States’ willingness to 
work with the existing government of Iran will be more persuasive. Possibilities might 
include making a special and public effort to ensure that essential medicines and medical 
supplies reach Iran (inadvertently, restrictions on financial transfers to and from Iran 
have limited Iran’s ability to import such goods); the cessation of some covert activi-
ties (which are seen by the regime as efforts to destabilize Iran) that would be evident 
to Iran’s leaders; the establishment of a “hotline” or some other dedicated, confidential 
channel of communication that could be used by both sides to seek clarification on 
events, statements, or actions whose meaning is unclear or apparently antagonistic; a 
public statement of America’s interest in working with Iran that includes no quid pro quo 
except for the demonstration of an equal willingness on Iran’s part to meet on similar 
terms at a time and place of their choosing (such a statement could be previewed to the 
Iranians, so its contents do not come as a surprise); a presidential acknowledgment and 
welcoming of the Supreme Leader’s fatwa against producing or using nuclear weapons, as 
one of the bases for nuclear negotiations (Secretary of State Hilary Clinton stated several 
times that the United States and Iran both were engaged in working to make the fatwa a 
reality)62; opening up opportunities for American diplomats around the world to speak 
to their Iranian counterparts, directly or through a trusted channel; or some other action 
or combination of actions that would clearly signal an intention to change the dynamics 
of the relationship through negotiations based on mutual respect. Ideally, signals would 
be sent in advance of discussions. The period immediately following Iran’s presidential 
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 1.5.2 U.S. wants: Full transparency of Iran’s nuclear program plus other con-
trols, in particular to constrain any possibility of an Iranian “breakout” to weaponization; no 
enrichment of uranium (highly unlikely) or (more likely) strict limits on enrichment based 
on the requirements of an acceptable (to the United States) civil nuclear program; no 
plutonium reprocessing or acquisition of plutonium by other means; cessation of threats 
against Israel; end of Iranian support for Hezbollah and Hamas; domestic human rights 
practices by Iran’s regime that are acceptable by international standards, including as 
regards religious tolerance and the treatment of women;  recognition of the legitimate 
U.S. role in the region; maintenance of acceptable relationships with Arab friends in the 
region; a separate state of Palestine established alongside the state of Israel; resolution of 
all outstanding residual claims against Iran on a satisfactory basis. 
 1.5.3 United States and Iran both want: The peaceful and stable develop-
ment of Iraq and Afghanistan; a ceasefire and stable, friendly government in Syria; no 
military conflict in the region; greater stability throughout the Gulf; better cooperation 
on commerce and open flow of trade, including oil shipments; cooperation on drug  
trafficking; defeat of al Qaeda and the Taliban; reduced Sunni-led terrorism throughout 
the region; open and unrestricted trading in petroleum. 
1.6 Developing a full appreciation of problematic language and concepts. 
Iranians and Americans attach different interpretations to certain buzzwords and  
concepts. For example, Iran prefers “discussions,” while the United States is more com-
fortable with “negotiations.” The United States might refer to “principles for talks,” while 
Iran prefers the more integrative concept of “modalities” for “discussion.” Iran is prepared 
to plan “meetings,” while the United States focuses on “our relationship.” Americans refer 
to “Iran”; Iran prefers to be referred to as “The Islamic Republic of Iran.” The United 
States uses “regime,” Iran prefers “government” or “state.” Iran evokes a litany of “past 
American offenses against Iran,” while the United States wants to move on to “practical 
next steps..” Iran has called the United States the “Great Satan”; the United States has  
referred to the “illegitimacy” of Iran’s unelected “mullahs” or regime. These differences, 
and many others, are not trivial and could become obstacles to progress in a charged in-
teraction. Some of the differences reflect important substantive disagreement: Iran claims 
the “right to enrich uranium”; U.S. experts argue that there is no such right enshrined in 
the Nonproliferation Treaty. At most, they suggest, the United States might “recognize” 
an Iranian program that is verifiably “in support of peaceful purposes.” (Neither party 
seems ready yet to talk of “diplomatic relations”; it took six years for the United States 
and China to reach that point.)   
by and where Iran faces six nations, at least four of which are seen by Iran as hostile.  
We believe that bilateral discussions between the United States and Iran will be essential.  
Iranian officials and the Supreme Leader have resisted bilateral discussions for a number 
of reasons, including their suspicion that the United States seeks the regime’s downfall 
and will use discussions to find a way to increase pressure on Iran. Before agreeing to 
bilateral meetings, Iran’s leaders are likely to want and need the kinds of assurances and 
positive actions that are suggested above.65  Because any effort to begin to work with Iran 
will be highly charged and unpredictable, as well as very sensitive politically, the Presi-
dent should have as his chief negotiator a trusted confidant, with a team of experts who 
also are patient and sensitive to the complexities of U.S.-Iran relations. 
 In the initial period of the bilateral discussions, the United States and Iran 
would need to agree to establish a regular channel for official written and oral commu-
nications (while discouraging potentially confusing back channel efforts, especially in 
the sensitive first phase of contact). Such a channel could be initiated through official 
contacts already available to the Swiss as the “protecting power” for U.S. interests in Iran, 
or through a third party that has the trust of both governments. 
1.5 Understanding what the United States wants, what Iran wants, and what 
both want to get out of working together. The U.S. team should be equipped with an  
approved outline of what the United States wants from negotiations and what we gauge 
that Iran wants—and where those wants intersect. It goes without saying that under-
standing what the other side wants does not mean accepting or endorsing those  
priorities.66  Nor is what each side wants to get necessarily the same as what each side 
needs to get in order to agree to a deal. Distinguishing between the two is critical for  
effective negotiation, and during the negotiation process, both sides will almost certainly 
have to adjust their thinking about which of their wants are really needs. But starting 
with an outline of wants is helpful because it will enable negotiators to identify potential 
common ground. We estimate that, in brief, the wants might look something like this:
 1.5.1 Iran wants: Respect for Iran as a sovereign nation and its dignity; U.S. 
recognition of Iran’s major and prominent role in the region; U.S. recognition of Iran’s 
full “rights” under international law, particularly as a signatory to the Treaty on the  
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons67; U.S. forces out of the Middle East; the lifting of 
all sanctions; full Iranian participation in international bodies; Israel/Palestine eventually 
to become a single state between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River with an Arab 
majority68; resolution of the outstanding residual claims of Iran against the United States 
on a basis satisfactory to Iran.69  
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motives. Iranian diplomats who know the United States well have been marginalized and many 
of the U.S. diplomats who know Iran well are retired. Many more Iranians speak English than 
Americans speak Persian (Farsi). Iran’s diplomats are seen by Americans as too abstract and 
allusive. Overcoming or at least neutralizing these unhelpful perceptions should be defined as a 
goal for talks, since the lack of mutual respect, if it continues, could doom negotiations.72 
 2.2.2 An end to decades of distrust and misunderstanding. To achieve 
this objective, each side will need to develop a cadre of specialists who become knowledgeable 
about the other side, including its language, culture, negotiating style, and “personality.” Even 
with sympathetic negotiators, working together for long hours and days, there will be times 
when relationships will seem to worsen rather than improve. But over time, such efforts can 
reduce misunderstanding and chip away at distrust. 
 2.2.3 Relations based on non-interference in internal affairs. As 
noted earlier, Iran’s leadership is persuaded that the American political system, as they put it, 
is committed to the overthrow of Iran’s regime. They will need some solid indication that this 
is not the ultimate objective of U.S. policy. This does not mean that the United States would 
not advocate for greater democracy in Iran or criticize Iran when it violates international 
standards of human rights—just as Iran would continue to criticize the United States.
 2.2.4 Agreement on an approach to managing the relationship.  
Any effort by Iran and the United States to work together would likely be characterized by 
profound differences, tensions, and even the danger of conflict. Therefore the two govern-
ments should try to establish mechanisms that reduce the threat of conflict, and should 
establish a phased approach that includes reciprocal actions, to be communicated in advance, 
across a range of issues. Focusing on relationship management is unlikely to be productive as 
a first negotiating step; rather, these arrangements could be worked out between negotiators 
over the course of discussions. A key element here is avoiding the use of force by accident or 
as a result of miscalculation or misperception. 
 2.2.5 Agreement on nuclear cooperation. The major U.S. objective with 
respect to nuclear issues would be to negotiate an arrangement that prevents the conversion 
of Iran’s civil nuclear program into a military program and denies Iran the ability to make 
a rapid or easy “breakout” to create a nuclear weapon. The overall framework of such an 
arrangement would “secularize the fatwa,” in Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi’s terms, by 
delineating what a purely peaceful nuclear program would entail and what types of activities 
and behaviors would be inconsistent with a purely peaceful program. To rebuild international 
2. BEGINNING TALKS WITH IRAN
The opening of bilateral talks with Iran would be seen by both sides as a momentous and 
perilous event. Talks between these highly neuralgic counterparts could break down quickly if 
the atmosphere is not right. 
2.1 Setting the tone. The U.S. side should begin by inviting an exchange of views with 
Iran on how each side sees the region and the world, what threats each side perceives to its 
security, etc.—underscoring throughout the respect the United States accords to Iran and 
its historic role. The United States should be prepared to review examples of cooperation 
between Iran and the United States in the decades since the Islamic Revolution. These initial 
exchanges should deal with high principles and objectives. Americans should expect that the 
Iranian side will have an extended list of historical grievances against the United States, and 
should be prepared to listen patiently. If these early meetings are held at a high political level, 
difficult issues might best be left to subordinates, at least initially. The approach that President 
Nixon and Henry Kissinger took to their opening conversations with Premier Zhou En Lai 
and Chairman Mao could provide a solid model of how to start such talks. 
2.2 Previewing objectives. Neither side will want to reach for a comprehensive solution 
(“grand bargain”) at the outset. But while the United States might prefer to focus first on prac-
tical, confidence building steps, the Iranians (as suggested above) are likely to want some idea 
of America’s long-range agenda and might be attracted by the identification of a bigger, more 
demanding  set of issues to be dealt with, as a way of testing U.S. sincerity about not seeking 
regime change. Taking the time to develop an outline of big objectives would contribute to a 
positive atmosphere. Among the overall objectives of talks might be: 
 2.2.1 Relations based on mutual respect. Iran’s leaders and negotiators 
have come to believe that Americans simply do not respect Iranians as a people, Iran as a na-
tion, or Persian culture. This perception derives, historically, from the United States’ instiga-
tion and financing (with Britain) of the 1953 coup d’état that overthrew Iran’s first democrati-
cally elected Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossadeq, and its support for the tyrannical Reza 
Shah Pahlavi. The perception also reflects observations about how Iran is represented in con-
temporary U.S. media and popular culture.70  The style of America’s diplomats, Iran believes, 
is to patronize and demand, which runs counter to Iranian rules of etiquette and hospitality 
(ta’arof). The formalities used by Iranian diplomats are disorienting to many Americans who 
are used to a more direct communication style.71  The other side of this coin is that many 
Iranians have only a very rudimentary conception of the United States, its society, and its  
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seek the technology, material, and skills that would give it the ability to produce a weapon 
should a decision be made to do so. There is some evidence that before 2003, Iran’s nuclear 
program had both a military and a civil purpose. If so, Iran would have breached the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty; this is something that the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) is still investigating under the rubric of “Possible Military Dimensions” (PMD). 
Current assessments by American and other governments’ intelligence services indicate 
that at this time, Iran has not made a decision to build a nuclear weapon.73  
3.1 Reaching agreement on the scope of Iran’s nuclear program. An impor-
tant U.S. goal would be to reach agreement with Iran on the exclusively peaceful nature of 
its nuclear program. As a basis for such a negotiated settlement, Iran would be expected 
to implement the Additional Protocol and abide by the “modified Code 3.1 of the Subsid-
iary Arrangements” to its safeguards agreements, requiring among other things, that Iran 
provide, early on, a description of the scope and parameters of its civil nuclear programs.  
Iran and the P-5 +1 could delineate activities and materials that would not be included 
in the Iranian programs because such activities—certain experiments, manufacturing of 
uranium metal, expelling inspectors, etc.—are neither necessary for nor consistent with 
purely peaceful nuclear programs.74 In negotiating these and other terms of a nuclear deal, 
Iran will press for provisions that are applicable to all NPT signatories and do not single 
out Iran for special treatment. Agreement by Iran to share plans for its civil nuclear  
program could become one of the confidence-building steps that would be part of a  
settlement between Iran and the P5+1. Iran has already publicized the Supreme Leader’s 
fatwa at the United Nations.75
3.2 Limiting enrichment and acquisition of separated plutonium. Iran’s enrich-
ment of uranium is the main source of the international community’s anxiety about Iran’s 
nuclear program, since a nuclear weapon cannot be built without either uranium enriched 
to weapons grade or plutonium.76  An initial agreement with Iran should include limita-
tions on the level to which Iran could continue to enrich uranium—no higher than 3.5% 
to 5%, the level required to provide fuel for nuclear power reactors—and on the quantity 
of enriched uranium that Iran could stockpile. Iran would be expected to cease produc-
tion of 20% enriched uranium (with the parallel assumption that fuel required to produce 
medical isotopes would be reliably supplied to Iran). Uranium enriched to 20% can be 
upgraded for weapons use relatively quickly and easily, so a first-phase nuclear agree-
ment with Iran will have to address this issue. The Iranians claim that this 20% enriched 
uranium is needed for their Tehran Research Reactor (the TRR, supplied to Iran by the 
confidence and to provide the transparency required to verify that Iran’s nuclear program 
is exclusively peaceful, Iran would need to accept enhanced monitoring and inspection of 
its nuclear facilities to affirm that Iran was upholding its commitment not to seek to acquire 
nuclear weapons. In return for Iranian agreement on these steps, the United States (and the  
P5+1) would agree to reduce and gradually eliminate sanctions; recognize Iran’s enrichment 
program, but only in support of peaceful purposes as outlined by Iran and consistent with the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty; and commit to cooperating in the development of some peace-
ful applications of nuclear technology, such as for medical purposes. The outlines of such an 
agreement, which are discussed in more detail below, would need to be shared early in the 
negotiating process. 
3. PURSUING A NUCLEAR DEAL
Negotiations on a nuclear deal (and on a broader set of issues, if appropriate) should be 
undertaken without preconditions, and the parties should agree to consider all ques-
tions that each side may feel it necessary to raise in the process. In addition, Iran and the 
United States would probably need to reach other bilateral understandings along the way 
(some of which are described below), in order to facilitate dealing with the nuclear issues. 
As indicated earlier in this paper, discussions between the U.S. and Iran on nuclear issues 
should proceed on a basis that is understood and ideally supported by the P5+1 and 
relevant multilateral bodies (including the UN Security Council and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency).     
 Another significant complication is that Iran and the United States define the 
nuclear “problem” differently. Iran’s nuclear policies and programs remain America’s 
paramount concern; Iran, however, sees this as a U.S.-created problem. For Iran, its 
nuclear program has become an expression of Iranian nationalism and scientific prowess, 
and developing that program (which Iran claims is exclusively dedicated to peaceful pur-
poses) is seen as a right that Iran enjoys as a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
U.S. policies and the UN Security Council resolutions that stipulate “zero enrichment” 
for Iran are viewed as discriminatory. Iran points to the fatwa of the Supreme Leader that 
outlaws the building or use of nuclear weapons, and argues that this should be taken as 
an assurance that Iran has no intention of building such a weapon.
 To the United States and many other nations, the nature of Iran’s nuclear activi-
ties, together with Iran’s efforts to conceal some aspects of the program, strongly suggest 
that Iran may have had the intention to build a nuclear weapon. It may still have such a 
secret intention, or at least the intention of keeping its options open. Iran continues to 
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United States during the Shah’s reign), which produces isotopes for research and cancer 
treatment; the United States has offered to provide the 20% fuel as needed and to assist 
Iran in improving the efficiency of the reactor to obviate Iran’s having to build several 
other reactors to meet their needs for isotopes to treat cancer.  
 In addition to the 20% issue, there are a number of related enrichment and fuel 
cycle concerns that will have to be addressed, including the status of the underground 
Fordow enrichment facility; the development of more advanced centrifuges; and the 
future of the Arak reactor program. In the case of Fordow and the new centrifuges, the 
focus will be on assuring the international community that neither would be used for 
rapid breakout from Iran’s NPT obligations. Providing such assurance would acknowl-
edge Iran's enrichment with limits and enhanced monitoring. A nuclear deal should also  
include a suspension of work on the Arak reactor that could produce plutonium. 
 The limitation on the amount of low-enriched uranium that Iran could produce 
and stockpile should reflect Iran’s current and future needs, as those needs fit within a 
plausible civil nuclear program. Enrichment levels and stockpiles would be monitored and 
verified by the IAEA. Reprocessing would not be permitted; nor would the importation 
of separated plutonium be allowed. While Iranian interest in selling fuel internationally 
would represent an additional complication, reasonable estimates could be made of the 
potential market and pricing and the issue most likely could be accommodated.  
 Once such a deal is reached between the United States and Iran, and with full 
agreement from the P5+1, the UN Security Council could be asked to endorse it, since 
several existing Security Council Resolutions—which have independent legal standing—
prohibit enrichment. Both Iran and the United States will have achieved a major objective. 
3.3 Ensuring transparency. The IAEA is best equipped to design and describe a  
program for monitoring any agreement reached with Iran (the IAEA will also want to 
clear up its concerns about Iran’s past PMD activities, as mentioned above). Any such  
arrangement should include provisions that allow for the continued modernization and 
improvement of monitoring techniques. 
3.4 Offering partial sanctions relief. Important as sanctions are as bargaining chips, 
the easing of sanctions would present serious challenges for the President, whose ability 
to modify many key sanctions without Congressional approval is limited. Certainly, a 
U.S. commitment to “no new sanctions” should be considered as part of any early deal. 
The European Union may be able to lift some of its sanctions on petroleum product  
 
exports to Iran and Central Bank financial controls more easily and rapidly than the 
United States. For a robust first phase agreement, consideration should be given to  
allowing the construction of pipelines for oil and gas between Iran and Pakistan and  
India, a move that would have benefits for us and our friends as well.
3.5 Longer-term possibilities. Over the long run, more creative approaches to Iran’s 
nuclear program might be worked out, such as an agreement to multi-lateralize or inter-
nationalize the enrichment program, enabling Iran to enter into partnerships with other 
governments. Iran itself has made such proposals in the past. 
4.  MOVING INTO BILATERAL RELATIONS
Assuming progress is being made toward a satisfactory nuclear deal, Iran and the United 
States could focus on the broader question of their bilateral relationship.
4.1 Establish a formal bilateral channel. A designated set of representatives in a 
third country could carry out this function, or an American-staffed U.S. Interest Section 
in Tehran could be created, with regular diplomatic and consular access on bilateral issues. 
Indeed, such a Section might be set up sooner for the exclusive interim purpose of issuing 
visas, beginning with visas for Iranian officials. On a reciprocal basis, the Iranian Interests 
Section in Washington might be staffed with Iranian diplomatic officers (it is currently 
manned by dual nationals) and permitted the same range and level of contacts.
4.2 Encourage diplomatic and official contacts. U.S. and Iranian diplomats and 
other officials should be authorized to maintain informal as well as formal contacts with 
each other throughout the world. Iranian diplomats at the United Nations should have 
greater freedom to travel to Washington and, on occasion, to other U.S. cities. Visits of 
American officials to Iran and Iranian officials to the United States should be encouraged 
and facilitated by both sides.
4.3 Facilitate exchanges. Each side should agree to facilitate the granting of visas 
in order to expand scientific, technical, academic, sports, cultural, and other citizen-to-
citizen exchanges. Tourism from both sides should be encouraged. Direct flights between 
Iran and the United States should be established, initially by third-country carriers. 
4.4 Manage hostile rhetoric. While neither side is likely to stop criticizing the other, 
sometimes harshly, the leaders of both countries, particularly the President and the 
Supreme Leader, should agree to avoid (and instruct other officials to avoid) hostile and 
inflammatory rhetoric, in order to build a better environment for talks. 
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5.  EXPLORING OPPORTUNITIES FOR COLLABORATION AND  
 MANAGING SOURCES OF CONFLICT
Once the groundwork has been laid for bilateral discussions (perhaps by the end of 2013), 
Iran and the United States would be able to explore opportunities for collaboration in areas 
of mutual interest. To be sure, these explorations will be drawn out, often frustrating, and 
on occasion unproductive or even counter-productive. Some issues will continue to loom 
as troubling obstacles to a more normal relationship. 
5.1 Discussions on Afghanistan and Iraq. As suggested earlier, the area that is most 
ripe for collaboration would be challenges in Afghanistan. Discussions aimed at producing 
bilateral and regional commitments not to interfere with Iraq’s development could be more 
difficult to carry off soon—but the achievement of such an understanding between the 
United States and Iran and other nations could prove to be consequential for U.S. interests. 
5.2 Drug trafficking. For years, the Americans and Iranians have been talking indirectly 
about collaborating on the control of drug trafficking, especially across Iran’s border with 
Afghanistan, where heroin trafficking is widespread and many Iranian border guards have 
been killed.77  Given the regime’s concerns about the growing problem of drug addiction in 
Iran, this issue too seems ripe for some kind of joint problem solving.  
5.3 Agreement to avoid accidental conflicts, particularly in the Persian 
Gulf. Bilateral talks could build on informal discussions that have already taken place 
between some Iranians and Americans about the need to enhance established communica-
tions channels and procedures between the countries’ respective naval and other military 
forces, in order to prevent incidents from escalating into conflicts. While some helpful ra-
dio communications already occur between elements of the two regular naval forces, more 
contact is needed. Both sides might note that Soviet and American negotiators developed 
an agreement in 1972 for similar purposes, called the “Incidents at Sea” agreement. 
5.4 A plan to wind down the sanctions and begin trade relations. One 
obstacle to sustained improvement in U.S.–Iran relations is likely to be Iran’s impatience 
with the pace at which the sanctions regime can be unwound. While the President may be 
able to reduce or lift some sanctions by Executive Order, their complete elimination could 
take years or even decades, given the broad range of behaviors for which Iran has been 
sanctioned, the participation of other nations in the sanctions regime, and the continu-
ing hostility of many members of the U.S. Congress toward Iran. In early discussions with 
Iran, the United States will need to explain this challenge carefully—including the practical 
aspects of the concept of separation of powers, which is not familiar to most Iranians—and 
work out a clearly understood plan that involves not only the United States and Iran, but also 
the UN Security Council, the European Union, and other sanctioning nations. 
5.5 Arab–Israeli conflict. Iran’s threats against Israel, its support for Hezbollah and 
Hamas, and its opposition to a two-state solution are among the most troubling obstacles to 
developing a new relationship with Iran. Over time, there may be ways to reduce and better 
manage this source of constant tension. This is a vexing problem and it is unlikely that early 
progress can be made. 
5.6 Cooperation on dealing with al Qaeda, its franchise elements, and the 
Taliban. The United States is a very long way from trusting Iran enough to discuss strate-
gies for dealing with al Qaeda and its offshoots throughout the Arab and Muslim world. Yet 
Iran has almost as strong a motivation as the United States to oppose these Sunni terrorist 
groups. Iran also has no love for the Taliban, although Iran apparently has found opportu-
nities to work with some Taliban groups, perhaps to spite the United States. Iranian intel-
ligence and IRGC agents are well informed on the activities of Sunni terrorists; if sufficient 
progress has been made toward resolving other critical tensions between the United States 
and Iran, the two might eventually be prepared to exchange helpful information. 
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V.
Concluding Observations: Costs and Benefits of  
Trying To Work with Iran.
We have presented a mixed and complex picture concerning whether and how the United 
States might strengthen the diplomatic track of its Iran policy and seek a more direct, 
constructive engagement with Iran—initially focused on resolving nuclear-related issues, 
and then (assuming progress toward a nuclear deal) on a broader range of concerns. In this 
concluding section, we offer a summary of the major costs and benefits of such an effort. 
COSTS AND RISKS
	 u Negative public reactions. Any decision by the U.S. President to work with 
Iran would be disruptive politically and psychologically for the entire region, since it would 
break with a traditional and dependable constant of opposing Iran in U.S. foreign policy. 
Public reactions to any new initiative with Iran could become an insurmountable obstacle. 
Strong negative reactions from Israel and perhaps Saudi Arabia could result in intense  
Congressional and international hostility. 
	 u Risk of rebuff or failure. There is the risk that Iran may rebuff U.S.  
approaches, either because Iran’s Supreme Leader remains convinced that U.S. policy really 
amounts to “regime change” or because domestic Iranian politics make it too difficult for 
Iran’s leadership to risk working with the United States (or because Iran actually wants 
nuclear weapons). It may be that no nuclear deal can be reached, even if direct negotiations 
with the United States get under way—either because the United States (and ultimately the 
P5+1) is not able or willing to present a sufficiently attractive nuclear package to Iran, or 
because Iran’s leadership ultimately decides that it cannot accede to international demands 
for the limitation and greater transparency of Iran’s nuclear program. Should rebuff or  
failure be the outcome of a U.S. effort to work with Iran, the image of the United States 
could be weakened in the Arab world. This could cause the United States to align itself 
even more closely with its traditional allies and friends in the region, which in turn could 
exacerbate polarization. 
	 u Risk that the timing is wrong. Some argue that the timing is not right for 
an effort to work with Iran. They argue that it would be better and less risky to put off such 
a decision until circumstances change in some way that forces or makes possible a “new  
relationship” with Iran. Such changes might include—for example—a crisis in the regime or 
military action taken against Iran. In the meantime, some observers and experts note, Iran 
is under such close scrutiny that it might choose not to develop a nuclear weapon, even if  
it wanted to, so there is no urgent need to try out a new policy approach. 
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       Leadership is the art of getting someone  
else to do something you want done because  
he wants to do it.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1951
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BENEFITS AND POTENTIAL BENEFITS 
	 u Limits to Iran’s nuclear activities and reduced proliferation risk. 
Neither increased sanctions nor sanctions plus the threatened use of military force is likely, 
on its own, to motivate Iran’s leaders to reach a nuclear deal.78  Only by working together 
directly to address core concerns will it be possible to change the Iranian regime’s calculus 
about complying with key international demands. 
	 u Improved ability to manage challenges in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Iran is a major player and has a major stake in the future of these two countries.  
Their eventual stability and growth cannot be assured without the engagement and even  
cooperation of Iran.79  In Iraq and in Afghanistan, U.S. and Iranian interests and objectives 
are reasonably aligned, despite disagreement on strategies and tactics. 
	 u A more balanced and coherent U.S. strategy in the changing 
Middle East. In today’s Middle East, the most violent and disruptive forces are non-state 
actors and opposition groups within nations. Simmering religious and ethnic tensions 
between Sunni and Shia, Christian, Jew, and Muslim, Persian and Arab, and Arab and Kurd 
are another source of instability that ignores national borders. In this context, the United 
States will want to have access to and contact with all of the governments in the region; the 
United States also will want to avoid playing a polarizing role between religious or ethnic 
communities. By working to reverse the downward spiral of U.S.–Iran relations, the  
United States could put itself on a more balanced footing and enhance its own ability to 
understand and manage growing challenges in the region. 
V.   CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS: COSTS AND BENEFITS OF TRYING TO  
 WORK WITH IRAN.
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VI.
Primer on Prior Initiatives to Improve U.S.–Iran Relations.
The history of the relationship between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran 
has been characterized by unaddressed grievances and missed opportunities on both sides. 
In this Primer, we focus on some of the most important attempts made during the past 
three decades to improve U.S.–Iran relations. In each case, we describe the context in which 
the overture was made and the nature of the overture, followed by an analysis of the reasons 
for its lack of success or (in a few rare cases) its success. This is a summary document. We 
have not attempted to provide a comprehensive account of each scenario here, but have, 
however, tried to convey the essential features of the interaction in each instance.  
1.  BACKGROUND: STRONG OFFICIAL RELATIONS DURING  
 THE COLD WAR, BREAK DOWN IN 1979
The United States and Iran developed a strong political and economic strategic relationship 
at the beginning of the Cold War. Until then, relations had been limited, but the United States 
usually aligned itself with pro-constitutional and nationalist forces within Iran, and Iran viewed 
the United States as a valuable counterweight to traditional Russian and British influence. By 
the late 1940s, the United States was advising the Iranian government on economic manage-
ment, helping to organize Iran’s police and military forces, and providing military assistance  
as a bulwark against Soviet expansion. By the mid-1950s, the United States and Iran had  
established strong trade agreements and fortified their political and economic ties.  
 The United States and Iran signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement in 1957 as part 
of the U.S.-led Atoms for Peace Program, although it was not until 1965 that Iran showed any 
interest in nuclear technology.80  The 1957 agreement provided Iran with technical assistance 
and research cooperation on peaceful nuclear energy projects81; the agreement also allowed 
Iran to lease enriched uranium from the United States. In 1967, the United States  
supplied Iran with the Tehran Nuclear Research Center, which included the Tehran Research 
Reactor (TRR). The TRR is a 5 megawatt-thermal pool-type light water research reactor that 
was originally fueled by highly enriched uranium, or HEU (it has since been modified and is 
now fueled by moderately-enriched uranium at 19.75%). The following year, Iran signed the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which regulates member states' nuclear activities. 
In the mid-1970s, when Iran’s leader, Reza Shah Pahlavi, announced that Iran would have 23 
nuclear power plants by 1994, the United States voiced support for his ambitious goal.82  In 
1976, President Gerald R. Ford signed a directive that granted Iran the opportunity to purchase 
U.S.-built reprocessing equipment and facilities that would enable Iran to extract plutonium 
from nuclear reactor fuel, providing another potential pathway to a nuclear weapon.83 
      If Iran acts as a nation and not as a revolutionary 
cause, there is no reason for America or other per-
manent members of the UNSC to be in conflict with 
it. On that basis I would hope that a negotiated  
solution would be found in a measurable time.
Henry Kissinger, 2013
“ 
”
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Despite the strong official relations between the United States and Iran during these decades, 
segments of the Iranian public had come to hold two major grievances against the United States. 
One source of resentment was America’s instigation and financing (with Britain) for the 1953 
coup d’état that overthrew Iran’s first democratically elected Prime Minister, Mohammad Mos-
sadeq, who had nationalized Iran’s oil industry. The second source of resentment was the United 
States’ longstanding support for Iran’s tyrannical and corrupt leader, Reza Shah Pahlavi. These 
popular discontents contributed to the Iranian Revolution of 1979 that overthrew the Shah.  
 The United States broke off all ties with Tehran in 1980, five months after Iranian militants 
stormed the U.S. embassy and took more than 50 American citizens hostage for what would 
ultimately be 444 days. Immediately following the Revolution, the United States cut off the sup-
ply of HEU for the TRR, causing it to shut down for several years and leaving Iran with billions 
of dollars’ worth of unfinished nuclear projects. By the 1980s, Iran was finding other means 
to finish these projects, first through an agreement with Argentina that gave Iran moderately 
enriched uranium (19.75%) to fuel the TRR. The TRR has been fueled at this level since 1987.84   
 In January, 1981, the U.S. and Iran signed an agreement known as the Algiers Accords, 
which addressed disputes and increased tensions that emerged following the Iranian Revolu-
tion. Signed by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Iran’s Deputy Prime 
Minister, Behzad Nabavi, with Algeria acting the intermediary, the accords principally sought 
to resolve the hostage crisis. The accords also marked a mutually agreed severance of official 
diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran.85  The first point of the four-point 
agreement committed the United States to non-intervention in Iran’s internal affairs, a pledge 
that has since become a point of contention, given Iranian suspicions that the real goal of U.S. 
policy toward Iran is regime change.86   
 Since 1979, U.S. interests in Iran have are represented by the U.S. Interests Section of the 
Swiss Embassy in Tehran. Iranians interests are represented by the Iranian Interests Section of 
the Pakistani Embassy87  in Washington. 
2.  1980 –1989: THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR; IRAN AND ISRAEL  
 MAINTAIN TIES; THE IRAN CONTRA AFFAIR
Opportunity for improved relations:
	 u While the Islamic Revolution and the hostage situation created a crisis in U.S.–Iranian 
relations, Israel's precarious security was best protected by continued collaboration with Iran 
(which Israel viewed as a potential check on Arab power), in spite of the new regime's anti- 
Israeli ideology. This collaboration became even more pronounced after Iraq's invasion of Iran 
in September 1980, since an Iraqi victory could spell disaster for Israel's security. Only three 
days after Iraq crossed Iran’s borders, Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan held a press  
conference to urge the United States to forget about past differences (even as Iran still held U.S. 
citizens hostages) and to “help Iran keep up its defenses” against Iraq.88  Despite the Carter  
administration's embargo on arms sales to Iran, Israel continued to supply Iran with arms  
and spare parts for Iran’s American made weapons. While President Carter objected to  
the sales, the Reagan administration later chose to turn a blind eye to them.89  In all, Iran  
purchased over $500 million worth of arms from Israel between 1980 and 1983, most of it  
paid through Iranian oil sales to Israel.90  Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon defended  
these transactions at the time, because Israel felt it was important “to leave a small window 
open” to possibly improving relations with Iran over time and because Iraq represented a  
much greater threat to Israel at that time.91 
	 u Throughout the 1980s, Israeli and American perspectives on Iran continued to  
diverge. Washington was increasing its support for Iraq in the war, while Israel assisted Iran 
due to the fear that an Iraqi victory would significantly boost Arab power in the Middle East. 
In 1985, Hezbollah (the pro-Iranian militant group in Lebanon) hijacked a TWA passenger 
plane, demanding the release of prisoners in Kuwait, Israel, and Spain. Hoping to win favor 
and a large arms sale from the United States, Iran offered to help negotiate the release of the 
hostages.  Meanwhile, the Reagan administration was becoming increasingly concerned 
about a perceived Iranian tilt towards the Soviet Union. Israel urged the Reagan administra-
tion to make contact with Iranian officials in order to support purported anti-Communist 
forces in Iran and to establish—in the words of then Prime Minister Shimon Peres —“a 
broader strategic relationship.”
	 u So there emerged a convergence of interest among the three parties: The United States 
wanted the release of the TWA hostages held in Lebanon, Israel wanted to rekindle ties with 
Iran and push the United States away from Iraq, and Iran was in need of weapons to win the 
war.93  With Israel serving as the conduit, representatives of the three states met several times, 
including a high-level meeting in Tehran in May 1986, involving top aides from the Reagan 
administration, among them National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane; Iranian arms 
dealer Manuchehr Ghorbanifar and Albert Hakim, an Iranian businessman; and Ali Hashemi 
Rafsanjani (nephew of later President Rafsanjani), who had received direct permission from 
the Supreme Leader to carry out the deal. Though the immediate topic of discussions was 
the arms-for-hostages proposal (Israel would supply arms to Iran in exchange for Iran’s help 
in getting the release of American hostages), some experts believe the United States intended 
to use these contacts to explore a new relationship with Iran. It certainly was the Americans’ 
hope that their Iranian interlocutors would help to strengthen moderate factions within Iran’s 
government—although the anti-Communist Iranians ultimately proved to have nearly no in-
fluence. In spite of frustrations and initial failures, McFarlane found the talks encouraging. He 
was left with the impression that there were “sensible people in Tehran” who were interested in 
“relieving their isolation, and restoring a measure of normalcy to relations with the West.”94 
u Due to internal rivalries within the Iranian government and alleged Iranian unhappiness 
about Israel’s direct involvement in the discussions, the secret negotiations and arms deals  
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were eventually leaked to the press by Iranians.95  With the revelation that profits were being  
channeled illegally to the Nicaraguan Contras, who were being armed by the United States to fight 
the Sandinistas for control of Nicaragua, the affair created one of the biggest scandals of the Cold 
War era.96  Even so, in a televised address to the American people, President Reagan defended the  
operation by stating that “it’s because of Iran’s strategic importance and its influence in the Islamic 
world that we chose to probe for a better relationship between our countries.”97  
Why the opportunity was missed:  
	 u In addition to being concerned about Iran’s ambitions to export its Islamic Revolution 
to neighboring countries, the United States was concerned about Iran’s potentially warming 
relations with the Soviet Union. The Cold War struggle for influence in the Persian Gulf was a 
driving factor in U.S. policy toward support of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, and trumped any 
warming of relations with Iran. Given the high price paid by Iran in that war (more than  
1 million Iranians injured and killed, 2 million displaced, and more than $600 million worth of 
damages98), the United States’ support for Iraq was a severe blow to the possibility of improved 
relations. U.S. alignment with Iraq not only emboldened hardline Iranian factions that were  
adamantly anti-American, but also weakened the more moderate factions that had been trying 
to rekindle ties with the United States.99
	 u In 1988, the United States Navy guided missile cruiser USS Vincennes accidentally shot 
down an Iranian passenger plane over the Persian Gulf, mistaking it for a fighter jet, killing all 
290 passengers on board. This incident casts a shadow on U.S.–Iran relations to this day. 
	 u In retaliation for Iran’s mining of the Persian Gulf during the Iran–Iraq War, which 
resulted in damage to an American warship, the United States launched its largest American 
Naval operation since WWII—operation “Praying Mantis.” This U.S. attack took place within 
Iranian territorial waters and hit some of Iran’s oil platforms in the Persian Gulf. Iran’s leaders 
believed that these actions were in direct violation of the Algiers Accords and eventually  
took their objections to the International Court of Justice, which ruled that "the actions of the  
United States of America against Iranian oil platforms... cannot be justified as measures  
necessary to protect the essential security interests of the United States.”  
	 u The Iran–Contra scandal proved politically damaging and distracting to the leaderships 
of both countries, on a domestic level. 
 
 
 
3. 1989–1992: RAFSANJANI’S OUTREACH AND THE FIRST  
 PERSIAN GULF WAR
Opportunity for improved relations: 
	 u The death of Ayatollah Khomeini, in 1989, led to a complex factional struggle among 
members of the ruling elite. Some pragmatic elements in the Iranian government became 
more influential and worked on loosening strict social controls. Led by President Hashemi 
Rafsanjani, a group within Iran’s leadership came to the realization that the war had exhausted 
the country, leaving Iran politically isolated from its Arab neighbors and weakened  
economically. These pragmatists began to shift the emphasis toward spreading the revolution 
by making Iran a model Islamic country that others would desire to emulate. To achieve that 
objective, Iran needed to modernize and focus on economic recovery—a task rendered next to 
impossible by Iran’s lack of access to Western technology and investments. This new orienta-
tion on the part of Iran’s leaders necessitated improved relations with the United States.
	 u In his 1989 inaugural address, U.S. President George H. W. Bush—eager to secure the 
release of American hostages in Lebanon—signaled to Iran that America would reciprocate 
positive Iranian gestures. As he put it, “goodwill begets goodwill.” When Tehran succeeded in 
securing the release of the remaining U.S. hostages, Iran’s leaders expressed the hope that “the 
Americans would halt their unreasonable animosity toward [Iran].”100 
	 u Iraq's invasion of Kuwait offered Tehran further opportunities to demonstrate its strate-
gic utility to Washington. A channel of direct communication was set up between Iran and the 
United States through the Swiss Embassy in Tehran. Iran permitted the U.S. Air Force to use 
Iranian air space; denied Iraqi requests for support; opened its borders to nearly 1 million Iraqi 
refugees.101  These steps were praised by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, but they were not 
reciprocated in any practical way by the Americans.102  
Why the opportunity was missed: 
	 u By the time Iran secured the release of the hostages in Lebanon, George H. W. Bush was 
engaged in an electoral campaign, and political pressures made it difficult for him to respond 
to this achievement or to Iran’s help in the war against Saddam Hussein with increased good-
will toward Tehran. Disappointed and heavily burdened economically by an influx of Iraqi 
refugees, Iran’s leadership became more distrustful of the United States’ willingness to align its 
actions with its promises.
	 u The defeat of Iraq in 1991 coincided roughly with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 
United States was now becoming the undisputed world superpower, and rapprochement with 
an estranged Iran no longer held the strategic value that it once had. 
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4. 1995: OLIVE BRANCH AND THE CONOCO DEAL   
Opportunity for improved relations:  
	 u The government of President Rafsanjani made another effort to reach out to the  
United States in 1994. Recognizing that a political opening was difficult to engineer, Rafsanjani 
calculated that if an area of common economic interest could be created, a political break-
through might follow. For the first time since 1979, Iran allowed international companies to bid 
on the oil production contracts—worth more than $1 billion—on two of its oil fields. Tehran 
conducted extensive negotiations with the American oil company Conoco. Conoco’s top  
officials kept the State Department and President Clinton abreast of the negotiations.103  
Why the opportunity was missed: 
	 u The United States was heavily invested in the Middle East peace process at this time  
and the Clinton administration came to believe that the isolation of Iran was essential to  
achieving peace between the Israelis and Palestinians, mainly because of Iran’s support of  
Hezbollah and Hamas. "The more we succeeded in containing [Iran], the more possible it would 
be to make peace," then-Assistant Secretary of State Martin Indyk explained.104  Though the 
Conoco deal had been approved by the State Department, groups such as the American  
Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) lobbied heavily against it, prompting President  
Clinton to scuttle the deal through an Executive Order.105  
5. REFORMIST WINS IRANIAN GENERAL ELECTION: KHATAMI   
 AND ALBRIGHT MAKE OVERTURES BUT POLICY FAILS TO  
 FOLLOW SUIT
Opportunity for improved relations:
	 u In 1997, Muhammad Khatami surprised the Iranian elite—and the world—by winning 
a landslide victory (70% of the electorate) in the presidential elections. A new, more liberal era 
seemed to have begun in Iran.106  Soon after taking office, in January of 1998, Khatami reached 
out to the United States in an interview with CNN, in which he called on both countries to 
move past their difficult past and into a dialogue of mutual respect and understanding.107 
	 u The Clinton administration was intrigued by this shift in Iran. Secretary of State Made-
leine Albright responded, in June of 1998, by welcoming Khatami’s call for a dialogue, calling for 
a new start in U.S.–Iranian relations, emphasizing areas of common interest, and announcing 
the lifting of sanctions on some Iranian exports to the United States.108  She expressed regret for 
the United States’ involvement in the overthrow of Iran’s democratically elected Prime Minister 
Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953, and stated that although “the gap between us is wide…it is 
time to test the possibilities for bridging this gap.”109  
 
 
Why the opportunity was missed: 
	 u Even as Albright responded to Khatami’s overture, President Clinton sent a letter to 
President Khatami that had a very different tone. It stated that the United States had evidence 
that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps was responsible for the terrorist bombing in Saudi  
Arabia of the Khobar Towers, in which 19 American citizens were killed.110  As a precondition 
for talks, Washington asked Tehran not to support any terrorist activity, to admit responsibil-
ity of the Khobar incident, and to extradite those responsible to Saudi Arabia for justice. The 
Iranians denied responsibility for the bombing, although Khatami responded by condemning 
terrorism and regretting the tragedy of Khobar. This disagreement became a major obstacle to 
talks. Later, inconclusive evidence from Saudi Arabia showed that Al Qaeda, not Iran, might 
have been responsible for the attacks,111  although FBI head Louis Freeh continued to maintain 
that Iran was in fact responsible.
	 u Presumed infighting in Iran between moderate and conservative factions prevented 
Khatami from responding to what the Clinton administration saw as concrete and  
unprecedented U.S. steps toward engagement. Some in Iran objected to Albright’s distinction 
in her speech between the “elected” President Khatami, and the “unelected” Supreme Leader.  
Hardliners in Tehran saw engagement with the United States as a threat to their power within 
Iran’s elite and a boon to Khatami’s reformist faction.  
6.  COOPERATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND BONN CONFERENCE 
Opportunity for improved relations: 
	 u After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Washington enlisted Iran’s help  
to defeat the Taliban and install a new government in Afghanistan. Although there is no 
agreement among experts on how helpful the Iranian guards in Afghanistan actually were, the 
United States did join a broader coalition with the Northern Alliance in 2001, which had been 
supported by Iran to topple the Taliban for nearly a decade.112  Direct collaboration was coor-
dinated in quiet meetings that took place in Geneva, led by Ambassadors James Dobbins, Ryan 
Crocker, and later Zalmay Khalilzad, together with Iranian Ambassador to the UN Javad Zarif 
as well as the Northern Alliance representative Younnis Qanooni. For the Khatami government 
in Iran, this was an opportunity to demonstrate Iran’s strategic utility to the United States. The 
apex U.S.–Iran collaboration in Afghanistan was the Bonn Conference in December 2001, after 
Iran had helped U.S. forces successfully enter Kabul and defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan. 
Iran’s role in the defeat of the Taliban was crucial, according to Dobbins.113  In addition, Iran 
also used its political influence in Afghanistan to help build consensus on a new post-Taliban 
constitution and government.
	 u This collaborative effort between Iran and the United States proved to be one of the few 
joint successes over three decades of hostilities. In 2001, President Khatami also called for a 
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“Dialogue of Civilizations” at the UN General Assembly, and asked that 2001 be a year for creat-
ing an environment of mutual respect among all nations.114  This was an important part of his 
presidential platform, to attempt to transform the nature of political dialogue among all countries.
How a brief period of collaboration became a missed opportunity: 
	 u Iran’s assistance in removing the Taliban government from Kabul was not publicly 
acknowledged by the Bush administration. Instead, in his State of the Union address in 2002, six 
weeks after the Bonn conference, President George W. Bush described Iran as part of the “axis 
of evil,” along with Iraq and North Korea.115  President Bush went on to say that Iran, along with 
the other members of the axis, were seeking weapons of mass destruction and warned against 
the dangers of the proliferation of long range missiles. The speech caused shock and outrage 
in Iran, among reformists and conservatives alike. It undermined Khatami’s credibility within 
Iran and emboldened the hardline factions, which argued that Iran should not have helped the 
United States in Afghanistan without putting a price on its cooperation ahead of time.116  Ad-
ditionally, Ambassador Dobbins noted that an Iranian general had approached him in meetings 
two months later in Geneva, stating that Iran was prepared to contribute to an American-led 
program to build a new Afghan Army. After consulting the highest level decision makers in the 
White House and State Department, Washington did not provide a response.117  Some Iranian 
diplomats who had been involved in the Afghan talks were later punished by losing their jobs, 
and other government officials became cautious about proposing any type of collaboration 
with the United States. The Supreme Leader and some others in the Iranian leadership became 
increasingly convinced that there was no area in which the United States and Iran could work 
together to seek an improved relationship.
7.  TERMINATION OF THE U.S. TRADE BAN
Opportunity for improved relations:  
	 u Just weeks after the fall of Baghdad in 2003, Tim Guldimann, former Swiss Ambassador 
to Tehran, hand delivered a document to Washington that offered comprehensive negotiations 
between the United States and Iran. In less than two years, Iran had found itself surrounded by 
hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. Perhaps fearing that Iran might 
be next on the Bush administration’s list, Iran seemed to be suggesting a renewed dialogue on the 
U.S.–Iran relationship. According to some sources, the offer was prepared by Sadegh Kharrazi, 
Iran’s ambassador to Paris, and might have been approved by the Supreme Leader Khamenei.118  
But this contention is disputed by others and the exact origin of this proposal remains obscure. 
The proposal suggested a framework for a new relationship between the United States and Iran, 
based on resolving the main points of contention. In this informal proposal, Tehran agreed to 
consider pressing Hamas and Islamic Jihad to stop violence against Israel; making Iran’s nuclear 
program fully transparent (i.e., signing the Additional Protocol to the NPT); helping to transform 
Hezbollah into a political organization; cooperating against all terrorist organizations (above all 
Al Qaeda); assisting in securing a non-sectarian government in Iraq (as Iran had helped to do  
in Afghanistan); and perhaps most surprisingly, accepting the Beirut Declaration, the Saudi 
Peace plan from 2002, which would symbolize Iran’s formal recognition of a two-state solution 
to the Israel–Palestine conflict and Iran’s willingness to consider itself at peace with Israel should 
such an agreement be reached by Israel and Palestine.
	 u In return, the Iranians asked the United States to exchange members of Mujahedin-e-
Khalq (MEK), an Iranian terrorist organization based in Iraq, for al-Qaeda operatives captured 
by Tehran. On a strategic level, the Iranians asked for the lifting of sanctions and for recognition 
of Iran’s right to chemical, biological, and nuclear technology programs for peaceful purposes.  
In addition, the Iranians asked for recognition of Iran’s security interests in the region. The  
proposal was presented as a step-by-step plan toward a mutually beneficial endpoint.119  
 u This informal outline of a “grand bargain” represented the most forthcoming offer of 
dialogue from Iran since the revolution.
Why the opportunity was missed: 
	 u The United States did not respond to Iran’s apparently informal but bold overture. Vice  
President Dick Cheney is said to have dismissed the initiative, reportedly asserting, “we don’t 
talk to evil.”120  It remains unclear what action, if any, was taken on this memorandum  
within the U.S. government.
8.  2003–2005: EU3 LEADS THE TALKS
Opportunity for improved relations:  
	 u After the Iraq war, the EU3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) engaged 
diplomatically with Iran to discuss the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions against Iran’s 
nuclear program. The EU3’s aim was both to further the UNSC efforts to persuade Iran not to 
begin enriching uranium and to head off the possibility that the United States might use military 
force against Iran. The overall objective was to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program did not lead to 
Iran’s capacity to build a nuclear weapon. Iran agreed to suspend enrichment in 2004 for nearly 20 
months and to implement the Additional Protocol to the NPT, in hopes of obtaining European 
(and American) acceptance of an Iranian nuclear program that would include some enrichment. 
Why the opportunity was missed: 
	 u The talks eventually failed to produce an agreement that would satisfy Iran’s insistence 
on recognition of its “right to enrich” uranium as a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. An EU3 proposal in August 2005 asking for indefinite suspension was rejected by the 
Iranian leadership, which believed that the Europeans and Americans were assuming that 
enrichment would remain suspended indefinitely without resulting in an agreement.121 
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	 u After the EU3 talks broke down, Tehran began preparations for initiating its enrichment  
program in August 2005. Iran had presented the EU3 with four different proposals—all of  
which had been rejected or ignored. From Tehran’s perspective, the utility of the talks dropped 
significantly once it became clear that the EU3, with the United States behind it, would not  
recognize Iran’s “right to enrich” under the NPT. 
	 u A few months later, the P5+1 offered Iran comprehensive talks, with the precondition that 
Iran reinstate the suspension of enrichment for an indefinite period. Iran rejected the proposal due 
to the precondition and the failure of the package to recognize Iran’s right to enrich. 
	 u At this time, Iran’s newly elected President Ahmadinejad also began taking a more hostile 
tone toward Israel and the United States, and removed many of the key Iranian negotiators who 
had been involved in the earlier decision to suspend enrichment. Iran began to enrich uranium 
again in 2005. 
	 u In 2005, the tables turned once more. The Bush administration reached out to Tehran, 
through Mohammed ElBaradei, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), seeking negotiations. Tehran dismissed the offer of direct high-level talks with 
the Americans as insincere. This dismissal may have been due in part to the fact that the United 
States was simultaneously working at the UN to increase sanctions on Iran, in concert with the 
international community.
9.  2007: OFFICIAL NEGOTIATIONS ON IRAQ’S SECURITY 
A modest accomplishment:  
	 u In 2007, the United States was facing mounting violence in Iraq, which was believed 
to have been backed by Iran. That same year, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, met 
several times in Baghdad with Iranian Ambassador to Iraq, Hassan Kazemi-Qomi, to discuss 
security and stability in Iraq. Although the talks were confrontational and consisted mainly of an 
exchange of mutual complaints, Ambassador James Dobbins said that “Iranian behavior in Iraq 
did moderate somewhat thereafter.”122  Although there were no concrete results of the Baghdad 
talks, there was a decline in Iran’s support of extremist Shiite militia groups within Iraq.123  
10. 2009: OBAMA’S OUTREACH
Opportunity for improved relations:   
 u Senator Barack Obama ran on a platform of reconstituting diplomacy as the preferred tool 
of American statecraft. In 2007, he stated that if he was elected president, he would “engage in 
aggressive personal diplomacy” with Iran and would offer economic inducements and a possible 
promise not to seek “regime change” if Iran cooperated on Iraq, terrorism, and nuclear issues.124  
Talking to Iran became the symbolic example of his commitment to diplomacy. In his inaugu-
ral address, on January 20, 2009, Obama implicitly offered America's hand of friendship if Iran 
would unclench its fist.125  In response, President Ahmadinejad sent President Obama a letter 
of congratulations on his election. Shortly thereafter, the Obama administration sent a letter 
directly to the Supreme Leader Khamenei, which Khamenei responded to immediately. This 
exchange was carried out through the Iranian and U.S. ambassadors to the UN, Ambassador 
Mohammad Khazaee and Ambassador Susan Rice, respectively.
	 u In the spring of 2009, President Obama took a step to improve the tone of U.S.–Iran 
relations with his unprecedented greetings to both the Iranian people and the government of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran (a rare mention of Iran’s official title by a U.S president), on the occasion 
of the Persian New Year.
	 u The Obama administration’s first objective was to secure a nuclear deal that reduced 
Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium and achieved better international control over its nuclear 
program. Though the United States preferred to begin negotiations with Tehran sooner rather 
than later, Washington put off a formal initiative until after the Iranian presidential elections in 
June 2009. Due to alleged fraud in those elections and the ensuing political protests, which were 
harshly suppressed by the Iranian government, diplomacy with Iran was put on hold.
	 u In October 2009, at a scheduled meeting of the P5+1 with Iran to discuss Iran’s compli-
ance with the UN Security Council Resolutions, including the renewed suspension of Iran’s 
enrichment program, the U.S. delegation had direct, bilateral talks with the Iranian delegation 
for the first time. Under Secretary for Political Affairs Bill Burns, and the Secretary of Iran’s 
Supreme National Security Council, Saeed Jalili, managed this initiative. Together with its allies 
and with the cooperation of the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United 
States proposed a fuel swap by means of which the West would provide Iran with fuel plates of 
20% enriched uranium, needed for its Tehran Research Reactor, in return for Iran surrender-
ing a large portion of its low-enriched uranium to a third country, under the supervision of the 
IAEA. The deal was conceived as a win–win, confidence-building measure. It promised to be 
the first such deal to emerge from the P5+1 talks, and it would have created some space and a 
better environment for a more detailed nuclear agreement and possibly even a broader diplo-
matic initiative with Iran. 
Why the opportunity was missed: 
	 u After some initial progress, and despite the fact that the deal had President Ahmadinejad’s 
backing, the fuel swap fell through, primarily because the Supreme Leader and several other  
high-level Iranian officials felt that it was not fair to Iran. Iran would give up much of its strategic 
asset (enriched uranium), but would not get the fuel plates until nine months later; also, there was 
no guarantee that the United States and its allies would not renege on the deal. Iran asked for a 
simultaneous exchange of uranium and fuel plates, which was rejected by the United States.  
Disagreement within the Iranian leadership made immediate acceptance of a deal impossible. 
	 u The United States was confused by Iranian rejection of what Washington saw as a  
negotiated deal, and viewed it as another example of Iran’s delaying tactics and false intentions. 
Even though there were subsequent Iranian efforts to renegotiate the deal, there was not  
sufficient political will on the part of the U.S. government to revisit it.  
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11. 2010: BRAZIL AND TURKEY TRY TO REVIVE THE TRR DEAL 
Opportunity for improved relations:  
	 u After Tehran’s failure to accept the fuel swap deal in 2009, the Obama administration 
sought a UN Security Council resolution to increase the sanctions against Iran. But two non-
permanent members of the Security Council, Brazil and Turkey, sought to revive the fuel-swap 
proposal instead of increasing sanctions. 
	 u While the United States was building consensus within the Security Council for a new 
round of more comprehensive sanctions, the Brazilians and Turks began negotiations in Tehran 
to secure Iran’s agreement to a variation of the fuel swap deal. After an 18-hour marathon of 
negotiations, the Turks and Brazilians, believing that they had the backing of the U.S. government 
(as described below), reached an agreement with the Iranians on a variation of the original deal 
struck the previous October. Within hours after the announcement of the “Tehran Declaration,” 
the United States rejected the proposed agreement and pressed for a vote on the new round of 
sanctions in the UN Security Council. The sanctions were approved. 
Why the opportunity was missed: 
	 u This diplomatic initiative brokered by Brazil and Turkey was racing against the UNSC 
sanctions package, which was ready to be passed. Unbeknownst to Turkey and Brazil, by the time 
they had arrived in Tehran to begin negotiations, Washington had already secured Chinese and 
Russian approval for a sanctions resolution.
	 u While the Turks and Brazilians described the Tehran Declaration as “a major break-
through,” the U.S. State Department was “skeptical” and did not believe that it represented 
“anything fundamentally new.” The Obama administration rejected the proposal on the grounds 
that Brazil and Turkey had missed the “sell-by” date—facts on the ground had changed, due to 
the growth of Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium, rendering the value of the deal questionable. 
But in a letter to the President and Prime Minister of Brazil and Turkey only a few weeks earlier, 
President Obama had made no mention of the changing facts on the ground and seemed to 
have been encouraging Turkey and Brazil to secure Iran’s approval for the fuel swap, referring 
to it as a “significant contribution to U.S. national security.” Once again, domestic politics was a 
key factor—President Obama’s political opposition was demanding new sanctions, and the 2010 
mid-term elections were only months away. The President chose not to disagree with Congress or 
Israel over the unpopular issue of negotiating with Iran.126  The administration had also worked 
hard to get the permanent members of the UNSC to approve the more comprehensive sanctions 
and did not want to miss the opportunity for an early vote in the Security Council.   
 
 
 
12. 2011: RUSSIAN STEP-BY-STEP PLAN
Opportunity for improved relations:  
	 u In July 2011, Russia proposed a step-by-step, four-point plan in which Iran would agree 
to cap its uranium enrichment level and allow transparency of its nuclear program in exchange 
for gradual lifting of international sanctions.127  Every step taken by Iran would be verified by 
the IAEA before reciprocation would be made. Russia relayed the plan to Iran, and, according 
to some sources President Ahmadinejad accepted a formulation of the Russian plan in August 
2011.128  What made this plan more appealing to Iran was that it defined a clear endgame and 
steps that must be taken by both sides in order for them to get there. It also would have resulted 
in early lifting of sanctions on Iran. The United States did not accept the Russian plan since it 
appeared to provide major concessions upfront to the Iranians. 
Why the opportunity was missed: 
	 u The P5+1 rejected the Russian plan, but seemed to agree on its general framework.  
U.S. officials have said that they have continued to consider the proposal’s framework, and held 
meetings with Moscow regarding the plan. Similarly, Iran had publicly welcomed the proposal 
but never officially committed to its terms.129 
13.  2012: ISTANBUL, BAGHDAD, AND MOSCOW:  P5+1 AND  
 TECHNICAL TALKS
Opportunity for improved relations:  
	 u In April 2012, the P5+1 and Iran renewed diplomatic negotiations in Istanbul. Two  
more rounds of meetings were held in May (Baghdad) and June (Moscow). In Istanbul, a step-by-
step process based on reciprocity and proportional offers within the framework of the  
Non-Proliferation Treaty was agreed upon as the basis for the talks. This was an important break-
through stimulated in part by the Russian initiative with Iran. The atmosphere in the Istanbul 
talks was more positive than in any discussions since October 2009. The new climate between the 
United States and Iran in Istanbul was encouraged, reportedly, by a constructive verbal message 
from the White House that was conveyed through several different diplomatic channels. 
	 u The Istanbul meetings led to an agreement for subsequent technical talks. But follow-
ing the Istanbul meeting, which ended on this relatively constructive note, the two sides began 
discussing the substance of the issues and the difficulties re-emerged. 
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Why the opportunity may yet be missed: 
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cap enrichment at 3.5%; and 3) close the underground enrichment plant at Fordo, cease  
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are not immediately used for domestic consumption.130  
	 u Tehran ruled out the closing of Fordo and remained skeptical about shipping out any  
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14. 2013: ALMATY AND ISTANBUL: A NEW ROUND OF  
 DISCUSSIONS
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No significant agreement has been reached. n 
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